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SMOKED NOT SNORTED: IS RACISM
INHERENT IN OUR CRACK
COCAINE LAWS?
KNOLL D. LOWNEY*
There comes a time when we cannot and must not close our
eyes when presented with evidence that certain laws, regardless
of the purpose for which they were enacted, discriminate un-
fairly on the basis of race, e.g., that for the murder of a white
person in Georgia, a black person is more than twice as likely as
a white person to be sentenced to death; that, in Minnesota, the
predominantly black possessors of three grams of crack cocaine
face a long term of imprisonment with presumptive execution
of sentence while the predominantly white possessors of three
grams of powder cocaine face a lesser term of imprisonment
with presumptive probation and stay of sentence.
-The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Russell'
* B.A., The Evergreen State College, Washington; J.D., New York University
School of Law. Associate, Preston Thorgrimson Schidler Gates & Ellis, Seattle,
Washington. I would like to thank all those who are struggling to bring justice and
sanity to our nation's drug and sentencing policies, especially The Sentencing
Project, Washington D.C. Also, thank you to Professor James Jacobs, Professor
Deborah Moranville, and Katherine Levine for your helpful comments on early
drafts, and personal thanks to my parents, Susan and Mark Lowney, and to Chloe
Gale, for your love and support. Any errors that exist in this Article are, of course,
the author's alone.
1. 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991) (citation omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the early hysteria over the crack epidemic in the mid-
1980s, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19861 to pro-
vide harsh new penalties for violations involving cocaine base,
otherwise known as crack cocaine or "crack."'4 Two facets of this
law and its subsequent amendments combine to create a potential
constitutional violation with dramatic consequences. First, the fed-
eral Code5 and United States Sentencing Guidelines6 adopted a 100
to 1 ratio, treating 1 gram of crack as equivalent to 100 grams of
powder cocaine for sentencing purposes. Second, harsh new
mandatory minimum sentences were adopted for drug violations in-
volving crack and powder cocaine.7 Under these new federal laws
- and under several similar state laws that followed' - people con-
victed of crimes involving even small amounts of crack are required
to serve mandatory minimum sentences without the possibility of
parole.9 Those convicted of crimes involving substantially greater
amounts of powder cocaine, however, are not subject to mandatory
minimum sentences.1°
2. See generally Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context: Politics
and Media in the Making of a Drug Scare, 16 CoNTrmm. DRUG PROBS. 535, 53943
(1989) (documenting early media attention on crack cocaine).
3. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970).
4. Throughout this Article, the term "crack" is used synonymously with what
federal and state statutes refer to as "cocaine base."
5. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B) (1988).
6. United States Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2D1.1 (Law. Co-op.
1993).
7. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text discussing the 1986 statutory
sentencing revisions. See also Dan J. DeBenedictis, How Long is Too Long?,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 74 (suggesting that Congress may soon eliminate mandatory
minimum sentences and discussing several criticisms of mandatory sentences, includ-
ing racial disparity).
The federal mandatory minimum sentences often result in prison sentences for
distribution of crack that are "incomprehensibly severe." Richard Leiby, A Crack in
the System, WASH. Posr, Feb. 20, 1994, at Fl. For example, petty crack dealers in
America may serve sentences three times those served by most murders, four times
those of most kidnappers, and five times those of most rapists. Id. at F4.
8. See infra notes 135-49 for a discussion of state laws regarding cocaine and
crack penalties. See also Appendix for an inventory of the state laws governing
cocaine and crack penalties.
9. See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying text.
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The constitutional guarantee of equal protection is implicated be-
cause there is a statistically relevant correlation between ethnicity
and the preference for crack over powder cocaine." Because Black
and Latino cocaine users are more likely to use cocaine in the crack
form than are White cocaine-users,'12 they are more likely to be sub-
jected to the stricter penalties. The disparity in sentencing for pos-
session, use, or trafficking of pharmacologically identical substances
suggests an equal protection violation.
The crack/powder cocaine penalty dichotomy is yet another sig-
nificant example of the heavier burden that people of color have
carried during the last decade's war on drugs.' 3 The existence of
this burden is borne out by the government's own statistics:
although African-Americans represent only 12% of the illegal drug
users in this country - almost equal to their percentage of the pop-
ulation - they comprise 44% of all drug arrests.14
Meanwhile, the same drug war hysteria that inspired enhanced
crack penalties effectively precludes a legislative solution to racially
discriminatory drug laws and policies. Despite government statistics
documenting the racial injustices caused by our nation's drug poli-
cies, only a handful of elected officials have shown the courage to
oppose these policies.' 5 Most politicians remain silent for fear of
11. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text; see also Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that if a statute has a discriminatory impact on mem-
bers of a minority group, such impact is one permissible factor in determining an
equal protection violation, and can be shown by demonstrating that the impact is
statistically relevant).
12. Statistics indicate that 92% of all persons convicted of federal crack viola-
tions are Black. Leiby, supra note 7, at F5. See also infra notes 118-19, 150-55, and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the ethnography of cocaine users.
13. See generally john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug
War. The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIs
L. REv. 557 (1991).
While the war against drugs potentially compromises the rights of all Ameri-
cans, it has a particularly devastating impact upon the recently gained rights of
minorities. In fact, the war on drugs could more aptly be called a war on the
minority populations.
Id. at 559.
14. Allan Ellis, Of Race and Incarceration, RECORDER, Dec. 5, 1991, at 6.
15. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 559-66 (illustrating how both
Republicans and Democrats derived political utility from endorsing the war on
drugs).
One politician to argue in favor of drug decriminalization was the mayor of Balti-
more, Maryland. See Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization,
18 HOESTRA L. REV. 501 (1990) (testifying before the U.S. House of Representa-
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being labeled "soft on crime," a dangerous proposition given the
popularity of the "get tough" anti-drug agenda.' 6 Our system of
constitutional rights and judicial review acknowledges that represen-
tative bodies are often incapable of protecting the rights of minori-
ties against popular campaigns such as the war on drugs. 17 It is
therefore not surprising that the only significant challenges to en-
hanced crack penalties are constitutional challenges by criminal de-
fendants charged under these crack statutes.18
Criminal defendants argue that enhanced crack penalties violate
the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection by meting
out harsher penalties for crack, which is more strongly favored
among Black and Latino cocaine users than White cocaine users.19
Unfortunately, constitutional precedent requires judges to be highly
deferential to the legislature regarding criminal laws.2" In order to
strike down a statute for violating equal protection due to an imper-
missible racial classification, a defendant must prove that the law
was passed with the purpose of racial discrimination.2' Especially
in the context of criminal statutes, the defendant's burden of proof
is almost impossible to satisfy.
Absent a showing of discriminatory intent, federal courts must
uphold the laws if they are shown to be "rationally related" to a
"legitimate" government objective.22 If such a "rational basis" is
shown, the challenged law is constitutional despite the fact that it
tives that drug abuse should be viewed as a health problem, not a criminal justice
problem).
16. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 563. Another commentator noted:
"In the nation's increasing anti-crime climate, championing lower sentences for
crack dealers is as politically astute as endorsing hollow-point ammunition sales in
school yards." Leiby, supra note 7, at F5.
17. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5, 15, 62 (2d ed.
1988); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (addressing oppression of weaker
minority groups by the majority).
18. See infra notes 190-225 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
20. At the federal level, virtually every court of appeals has considered and re-
jected criminal defendants' arguments that the discrepancy between sentences for
crimes which involve crack and those which involve powder cocaine rise to the level
of an equal protection or a due process violation. See infra notes 202-11 and accom-
panying text.
21. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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has a racially discriminatory impact.' Application of the rational
basis test assures that federal equal protection challenges to en-
hanced crack penalties are universally rejected.24 In other words,
the deference inherent in the rational basis test fosters judicial myo-
pia, preventing the federal courts from recognizing what is arguably
the most serious modem form of racial injustice: the over-incarcera-
tion of Blacks and Latinos through the war on drugs.25
A 1991 Minnesota Supreme Court case, State v. Russell,26 revives
the possibility of a successful equal protection challenge to en-
hanced crack penalties. The court in Russell held that although en-
hanced crack penalties may not violate federal equal protection
guarantees, they do violate equal protection under the more protec-
tive and less deferential Minnesota Constitution.27
This Article uses Russell as a vehicle to critically evaluate the ra-
cially discriminatory impact of the war on drugs in general, and fed-
eral and state enhanced crack penalties in particular. Part I of this
Article surveys what is arguably the most severe indictment of the
war on drugs: the over-incarceration of Blacks and Latinos. Part II
discusses the potential for bias and discrimination in drug scheduling
and penalty setting because it is impossible to base drug laws on
objective criteria.
Part III focuses on crack cocaine. The discussion begins with a
survey of various federal and state crack laws, highlighting the har-
sher sentences given to violations involving crack than to those in-
volving powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride). Next, the
correlation between the ethnography of cocaine users and prefer-
ence for crack over powder cocaine will be demonstrated by govern-
ment statistics, revealing the predictability and severity of the
racially disparate impact of enhanced crack penalties. Part III also
attempts to identify a rational basis with which to justify the harsher
penalties given to crack violations, concluding that such a justifica-
tion does not exist.
23. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text discussing the application of
the federal rational basis test.
25. See infra notes 43-75 and accompanying text, which detail minority over-
incarceration statistics.
26. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991). See infra notes 229-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Russell opinion.
27. Id. at 889.
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Finally, Part IV explores the possibility of pursuing an equal pro-
tection challenge to enhanced crack penalties, beginning with a re-
view of the federal equal protection doctrine's failure in this area.
This Article ultimately argues that state supreme courts should scru-
tinize enhanced crack penalties under state equal protection doc-
trines that are or can be more protective than the federal equal
protection doctrine, thereby following the successful example of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Russell.
In light of political inertia and lack of federal judicial activism, it
may be that expansion of state equal protection guarantees and suc-
cessful challenges to enhanced crack penalties are mutually depen-
dent. This is because state equal protection challenges are one of
the few remaining hopes for challenging discriminatory state drug
statutes. Similarly, state courts will only expand their equal protec-
tion guarantees when faced with a policy argument sufficiently com-
pelling to justify abandoning the deferential federal standard. The
discriminatory effects of the war on drugs in general, and crack pen-
alties in particular, present precisely such an argument.
I: TmE WAR ON DRUGS AND Tim CRIME OF BLACK
IMPRISONMENT
A. General Population
The United States leads the world with the highest rates of incar-
ceration.2 8 The cost of incarcerating the 1.1 million Americans cur-
rently behind bars is equally staggering, estimated at over $20.3
28. MARC MAUER, AMERICA BEIND BARS: ONE YEAR LATER 1 (1992). This
statistic represents a continuous and steepening increase in U.S. incarceration rates.
"Between 1980 and 1988, the combined federal and state prison populations in-
creased by 90%." Id. at 7. The U.S. prison population has tripled since 1970, and
doubled since 1980. Fox Butterfield, U.S. Expands Its Lead in the Rate of Imprison-
ment, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1992, at A16.
While U.S. rates of incarceration increased, the South African government took
effective steps to decrease its prison population. Between 1989 and 1990,
The U.S. incarceration rate increased by 6.8 percent to 455 per 100,000, while
the South African rate declined by 6.6 percent, [to] 311 per 100,000 .... In 1991,
the Conservative British government and the apartheid government of South
Africa developed policies committed to reducing their respective prison popula-
tions, in contrast to continued efforts of the federal government in the U.S. to
promote harsher sentencing and increased prison populations.
MAUER, supra, at 1.
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billion a year.29 Costs are expected to rise due to the construction of
additional prisons3" and the increasing costs of maintaining prison-
ers.31 It is likely that prison populations will also continue to rise:
federal and state correction officials predict a 30% increase by
1995.32
The most important factors contributing to this expanding crimi-
nal justice system are the policies adopted as part of the war on
drugs. The raw numbers of arrests and convictions for drug viola-
tions steadily increase.33 Additionally, the length of sentences
29. Id. Expenditures for corrections are expected to continue rising. Between
1979 and 1990, all government expenditures for "corrections" increased by over
313%, compared to a 185% increase for the criminal justice system as a whole. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 3, at tbl. 1.3
(Timothy J. Flanagan & Kathleen McGuire eds., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
30. Correctional systems in the United States were predicted to spend "more
than $6.7 billion on new prison construction during 1989 and 1990, up almost 73%
from 1987 to 1988." Rex Smith, New York's Prison Boom: Spending for Jails Has
More Than Tripled Under Cuomo, NEWSDAY, Oct. 8, 1990, at 5.
31. The federal government currently spends at least $20,000 per prisoner annu-
ally. The World's Top Jailer, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1992, at 6A. New York spends
approximately $30,000 per prisoner annually. Smith, supra note 30, at 5.
32. MAUER, supra note 28, at 2 (citing DOC's Project Future Prison Populations,
CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM (Nov. 1991)). See also UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-
rICE SYSTEM 116, fig. 2 (Aug. 1991) (finding new sentencing guidelines and tougher
penalties for drug violations may result in a 119% increase in the federal prison
population between 1987 and 1997) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES].
33. The number of drug offenders in federal prisons has more than doubled
since 1981. Currently, drug offenders comprise 53% of the inmate population, and
that figure is expected to increase to 69% by 1995. MAUER, supra note 28, at 7. The
total number of annual drug convictions in United States district courts tripled dur-
ing the years 1980-89, from 5,135 to 15,799. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 501, tbl.
5.16.
In local jails, the proportion of inmates charged with drug offenses increased
from 9 percent to 23 percent from 1983 to 1989, with drug offenders accounting
for 40 percent of the increase in jail populations during this period. Although
the most recent available data on state inmate populations are for 1986, when
drug offenders made up 8.6 percent of the inmates, all indications are that the
proportion has risen considerably in the past several years. In Florida, prison
admissions for drug crimes climbed 1,825 percent from 1980 to 1989, compared
to an increase of 381 percent of all crimes in that period.
MAUER, supra note 28, at 7-9 (citations omitted).
Since 1980, the number of new inmates committed to New York state prisons on
drug charges has risen by almost 800%. Smith, supra note 30, at 5. In California,
the percentage of drug offenders among prison admissions nearly tripled between
1985 and 1990. Barry Bearak, Big Catch: Drug War's Little Fish; More and More of
1994]
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given to those convicted of drug violations are rising dramatically as
a result of new mandatory penalties.34 Although the war on drugs
produces an increasingly drug-addicted prison population, 35 treat-
ment for those in the criminal justice system remains scarce.36 The
lack of treatment contributes to a high rate of recidivism among
drug violators.37
the Narcotics Trade's Minor Players are Winding Up Behind Bars, Crowding Prisons
and Jails, L.A. TIMEs, May 6, 1990, at 1.
34. One commentator discussed this correlation between increased drug
sentences and overcrowded prisons:
Over the past six years, Congress and state legislatures have enacted a series of
stringent anti-drug laws that have dramatically increased the penalties for even
minor drug crimes. The result: an overwhelmed court system and a staggering
increase in the nation's prison population.... [Between 1988 and 1990], the
average sentence for inmates convicted of drug offenses,... increased from 58
to 77 months.
Michael Isikoff, Getting Too Tough on Drugs: Draconian Sentences Hurt Small Of-
fenders More than Kingpins, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 1990, at C1. See also DeBenedic-
tis, supra note 7, at 77 (noting Attorney General Janet Reno's concern with prison
overcrowding caused by mandatory sentences).
35. Between 1983 and 1989, the percentage of all inmates who had ever used
cocaine or crack rose from 38% to 50%; the percentage of those who had used
cocaine in the month before the offense for which they were incarcerated increased
from 11.8% to 23.6%; the percentage who were under the influence of drugs at the
time of the offense increased from 5.5% to 13.7%. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at
628, tbl. 6.59.
36. Estimates are that "only about 20 percent of the more than 500,000 state
prison inmates in need of drug treatment actually receive any treatment, and that
only 364 of an estimated 27,000 federal inmates with moderate or severe drug
problems were enrolled in intensive treatment." MAUER, supra note 28, at 9 (cita-
tions omitted). In 1989, only 5% of all jail inmates and 8.1% of jail inmates who
have ever used a major drug (heroin, cocaine, crack, methadone, LSD, PCP) were in
treatment. SOURcEBOOK, supra note 29, at 631, tbl. 6.66.
"Although treatment programs have waiting lists of six months or longer in many
communities, 70 percent of federal anti-drug funding is still directed toward law en-
forcement and only 30 percent to treatment and prevention." Marc Mauer, Lock
'Em Up is not Key to Crime Control, NEWSDAy, Feb. 11, 1992, at 44 [hereinafter
Lock 'Em Up]. In 1989, "the states and federal government allocated $5.2 billion
for new prisons, roughly the same amount the federal government allocated for drug
prevention and treatment in the entire decade of the 1980s .... About 80% of the
[Delaware] inmates arrive with drug or alcohol problems .... Once there, treat-
ment is scarce - or nonexistent." Bearak, supra note 33, at Al. Drugs, however,
are virtually always available to inmates. Id.
37. In 1989, over 84% of inmates with prior convictions had used cocaine or
crack within one month before their current offense. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29,
at 630, tbl 6.64.
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Despite the expansion of our prison populations and drug en-
forcement machinery, there is no evidence that drug use or crime
rates are decreasing.38 The 1991 Household Survey by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse reported an 18% increase in the number of
people using cocaine at least once a month, and a 29% increase in
the number of weekly cocaine users.39 Although overall drug use
among young people has declined somewhat,4° the government sur-
vey revealed an increase in drug use among African-Americans and
a persistence of inner-city drug use.4 In other words, the war on
drugs has been ineffective in deterring drug use among urban mi-
norities who are subjected to the heaviest criminal sanctions. This
population is not only severely ravaged by the use of drugs, but also
suffers from the equally devastating effects of the war on drugs, in-
cluding high rates of arrests and incarceration, and deprivation of
civil liberties.42
38. During the 1980s, U.S. crime rates did not fluctuate substantially. However,
the inmate population doubled during that time. Lock 'Em Up, supra note 36, at 44.
Some statistics which show decreasing crime rates do not take into consideration
that the U.S. population has aged in the past decade, so that there are fewer people
in the age bracket in which most criminals are included. Once adjusted for this
change, it is evident that crime rates have increased. See Darell Steffensmire &
Miles D. Harer, Did Crime Rise or Fall During the Reagan Presidency? The Effects
of an 'Aging' U.S. Population on the Nation's Crime Rate, J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
3 (1991).
39. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 33 (1991).
40. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
ON DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTS 1990, at 17-18 (1991) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD SUR-
VEY HIGHLIGHTS]; Race, Sentencing, and Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW AND
URBAN PROBLEMS, 159 PLI/Crim. 31 WL at *25 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series, 1991) [hereinafter Race & Sentencing].
41. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HIGHLIGrrS, supra note 40, at 27-28.
42. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 580-99 (analyzing the impact of
the war on drugs on Fourth Amendment rights). These commentators summarized
the racial discrimination inherent in the war on drugs:
The drug crisis targets poor minority populations in four major ways. First,
drug abuse itself exacerbates the serious health problems already endemic to
poverty. Second, the war on drugs, with its emphasis on law enforcement,
drains resources that would be better spent on health, social welfare, job, and
education programs desperately needed in minority communities. Third, the
profitability of the drug trade, which is perpetuated by the government's prohi-
bition against drugs, attracts a large number of minority youths who perceive
few other alternatives for achieving the "good life." These young people have
the means and motivation to use violence to protect their livelihood. Fourth,
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
130 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:121
B. The Crime of Black Imprisonment
In 1989, almost 23% of Black men between ages 20 and 29 were
either in prison, jail, or on probation or parole on any given day.43
In California, this number was 33%. 44 Nationally, the total number
of young Black men involved with the criminal justice system
(609,690) exceeded the total number of Black men of all ages en-
rolled in colleges.4' In contrast, only 1 young White male in 16
(6.2%) was under the control of the criminal justice system. 46 La-
tino males were in between, with 1 in 10 (10.4%) involved.47
Although the number of women in the system was much lower, the
racial disproportions were parallel.4"
Annual statistics disclose the exponential increase in racially dis-
parate incarceration rates. Between 1989 and 1990, the incarcera-
tion of non-juvenile Black men increased by about 10%, from
454,724 to 499,871; this represented a one-year increase of 8.4% in
the rate of incarceration per 100,000 population.49 It is estimated
that by the year 2000, half of all state prisoners will be Black."0 In
Florida, researchers predict that by 1994, nearly half of the Black
having helped to create the problem, law enforcement efforts then target mi-
nority populations for surveillance, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration ....
Id. at 599-600.
See generally Paul Fmkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the
War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1389 (1993) (arguing that the war on drugs has,
like military wars, led to the erosion of the civil liberties of criminal defendants);
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights,
38 HAsrINGS L.J. 889, 925 (1987) ("Personal freedom is the inevitable casualty of
the War on Drugs.").
43. MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (1990). The report
looked only at the number of Black men involved in the system on a single day, but
the number would presumably be higher if calculated over an entire year. Id.
44. Ellis, supra note 14, at 6.
45. Id.
46. Race & Sentencing, supra note 40, at *2.
47. Id.
48. Id. For women in their 20s, relative rates of criminal justice control are 2.7%
for Black women; 1% for White women; and 1.8% for Hispanic women. Id.
49. In South Africa, between the same years, the Black male inmate population
decreased by 2.3% and the rate of incarceration per 100,000 population decreased
by 6.6%. MAUER, supra note 28, at 3, tbl. 2.
50. Joseph L. Galloway et al., A Bleak Indictment of the Inner City, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Mar. 12, 1990, at 14.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/5
IS RACISM INHERENT IN CRACK COCAINE LAWS?
men in the 18-to-34 age group will be in jail or under court
supervision. 51
The primary factor contributing to these imprisonment rates is the
focus of the war on drugs on Black drug users. Although Blacks
comprise only 12% of the illegal drug users in the country, they ac-
count for 44% of all drug arrests.52 Extreme examples of this abuse
occurred in the state of New York, where 92% of those arrested for
drug-related crimes in 1989 were Black or Latino.13 and in Sacra-
mento, California, where 70% of all people sent to prison for drug
offenses were Black.54 In Michigan, drug arrests doubled between
1985 and 1990, while drug-related arrests of Blacks tripled.55 In
1989, 27% of the nation's Black inmates' most serious offense in-
volved drugs, whereas the same was true of only 14% of White
inmates.5
6
The tragedy of these arrest and conviction statistics becomes glar-
ingly apparent when one considers that the discriminatory enforce-
ment of our drug policies in turn results in discriminatory
application of mandatory minimum sentences. A recent study by
the United States Sentencing Commission,5 7 conducted at the re-
quest of Congress, examined the sixty federal mandatory sentencing
51. "In Florida in 1989-90, blacks constituted 39 percent of felony marijuana
cases but made up 58 percent of those detained before trial for that charge." Ellis,
supra note 14, at 6.
52. Id. Reports by the FBI and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
in 1988 concluded that Blacks comprise 12% of the nation's drug users, a lower
percentage than Whites. Ron Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1990, at Al. From 1984 to 1988, the percentage of all drug arrestees who
were Black rose from 30% to 38%. U.S. Has Highest Rate of Imprisonment in
World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1991, at A14. In 1989, 40.7% of drug arrestees were
Black. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 444, tbl. 4.9. See generally Alfred Blumstein,
Racial Disproportionality of US. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv.
743, 750-54 (1993) (finding that racial disparities are greater for drug convictions
than drug arrests).
53. Bearak, supra note 33, at Al.
54. Ellis, supra note 14, at 6.
55. U.S. Has Top Jailing Rate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Top
Jailing Rate].
56. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 622, tbl. 6.48.
57. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 32, at 5-15. The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (1984) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988)), established the United States Sentencing Commission.
See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 32, at 16-19, for a historical
overview of the Commission.
19941
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statutes established since 1984. The Commission found that four of
these statutes were responsible for 94% of the mandatory sentences
imposed.58 Over 91% of these convictions were for drug offenses.5 9
Consequently, over 63% of defendants convicted for crimes requir-
ing federal mandatory minimum sentences were Black or Latino,
and 33% had no prior criminal record. 0 The report also noted "ra-
cial disparity in the means by which these statutes were imple-
mented. In one-third of the cases in which the circumstances of the
case appeared to call for a mandatory minimum, prosecutors agreed
to plea bargain below the minimum.",6 1 The Commission concluded
that the application of the mandatory minimum appeared to be re-
lated to the race of the defendant.6 As of January 1991, forty-six
states had also adopted laws requiring mandatory prison time for
drug offenses. 63
Black and Latino juveniles have fared no better in the war on
drugs than their adult counterparts. Between 1985 and 1986, there
was a 71% increase in the number of non-White youths detained for
drug offenses.' During those years, the number of Black and La-
tino detainees increased over 30%, while the number of White de-
tainees increased 1%.6' According to the United States
Department of Justice, the disproportionate increase in the number
58. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 32, at 10. The four offenses
were manufacture and distribution of a controlled substance, possession of a con-
trolled substance, importation or exportation of a controlled substance, and posses-
sion of a firearm during a drug-related or violent crime. Id.
59. Id. at 10-12.
60. See MAUER, supra note 28, at 10 (analyzing and reporting Sentencing Com-
mission report data); see also MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 32, at
80, tbl. 22.
61. MAUJER, supra note 28, at 11.
62. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 32, at 76-82.
In contrast to the apparent differences between males and females, which disap-
pear in the multivariate analysis, the differences among Blacks, Hispanics, and
Whites did not disappear when measured differences in offense behavior are
controlled. However, this is not to say that other unmeasured characteristics
account for these differences.
Id. at 82. No consistent relationships were found based on age or citizenship. Id.
63. Top Jailing Rate, supra note 55, at 5.
64. HOWARD A. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UPDATE ON STATISTICS:
GROWTH IN MINORITY DETENTION ATrRIBUTED TO DRUG LAW VIOLATORS 6
(Mar. 1990) (describing data from cases processed during 1985 and 1986) [hereinaf-
ter UPDATE ON STATISTICS].
65. Id. at 3.
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of minority youth being detained resulted from the extremely large
increase in the number of these youth referred to juvenile court for
drug offenses, as well as to an apparent change in the way courts
deal with drug offense cases.' Specifically, between 1985 and 1986,
the number of White youth referred to court for drug offenses de-
clined by 6%, while the number of non-White youth referred for
drug offenses rose by 42%;67 youths who were referred for drug of-
fenses were detained in disproportionately higher numbers than
those referred for other offenses,68 and non-White drug offenders
were detained at almost twice the rate of White drug offenders. 69
Finally, detention was most often ordered in larger counties, where
a higher proportion of non-White youth reside.70
The disproportionate detention of non-White youth continues to
increase. In 1988 drug delinquency cases, Blacks were over twice as
likely to be detained pending juvenile disposition than were
Whites.71 Between 1987 and 1989, the number of youth held in pub-
lic juvenile facilities for alcohol and drug offenses increased by
50%.72 By 1989, 50% more non-White juveniles were detained than
White juveniles.7 3
It is impossible to predict the long term effects of over-incarcera-
tion on communities of color. A large segment of the African-
American male population is being effectively removed from the job
market by the disability and social stigma of conviction, thereby be-
coming more vulnerable to substance abuse and resorting to the
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Although the increase in detention was proportional to the caseload in-
crease, the rise in detention rates was not distributed proportionally across offense
categories. The number of drug cases handled by the courts increased by only 1%
between 1985 and 1986, while the number of detained drug cases increased by 21%.
Id. at 5.
69. In drug trafficking cases, 28% of Whites were detained and 50% of non-
Whites were detained; in drug possession cases, 22% of Whites were detained and
33% of non-Whites were detained. UPDATE ON STATIsTics, supra note 65, at 4.
70. Thirty percent of juveniles handled in large counties were detained, com-
pared to twenty-six percent in medium-sized counties and sixteen percent in small
counties. Id. at 3.
71. Data compiled for 13 states revealed that 25% of White juveniles were de-
tained; 52% of Black juveniles were detained. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 571,
tbl. 5.93.
72. Id. at 605, tbl. 6.24.
73. Id. at 604, tbl. 6.22.
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drug economy for post-incarceration employment.74 This group also
runs a higher risk of death from overdose, AIDS, and drug trade
violence.75 Perhaps equally important are the devastating effects
that incarceration can have on the families of prisoners.
This litany of statistics clearly demonstrates that the war on drugs
has a racially disparate impact. The statistics do not, however, an-
swer the question of which drug policies are to blame. TWo compo-
nents of drug control strategy can be identified as directly resulting
in the over-incarceration of African-Americans and Latinos: the dis-
criminatory enforcement of drug laws, and bias in drug classification
and penalty setting. Crack cocaine laws, which are the focus of this
Article, exemplify the latter.
II: BIAS IN DRUG CLASSIFICATION AND PENALTY SETTING
Commentators argue that anti-drug laws always over-criminalize
those drugs preferred by disempowered segments of society, while
those in charge of the opinion and policy-making machinery normal-
ize the use of drugs they prefer.76 Thus, the specific contours of our
narcotics laws can be seen in terms of cultural competition between
White alcohol and prescription drug-users and various social minori-
ties.77 When a dominant segment of society uses a particular drug, it
is classified as an agricultural product, such as wine, tobacco, and
coffee, or sold through prescriptions.7" As per capita intake de-
clines, or the use becomes marginalized to a disempowered popula-
tion, restrictive legislation expands.79 David Musto traced this
history of drug prohibition:
The most passionate support for legal prohibition of narcotics
has been associated with fear of a given drug's effect on a spe-
cific minority. Certain drugs were dreaded because they seemed
to undermine essential social restrictions which kept these
groups under control: cocaine was supposed to enable blacks to
withstand bullets which would kill a normal person and to stim-
74. Race & Sentencing, supra note 40, at *27.
75. powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 600-02, 608-09.
76. See generally DAVID F. MusTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, ORIGINS OF NAR-
COTICS CONTROL 1-23 (1973).
77. See generally CHARLES MrrCHELL, THE DRUG SOLUTION 23 (1992); MUSTO,
supra note 76, at 5-6, 245.
78. MrrcHELL, supra note 77, at 25.
79. Id.
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ulate sexual assault. Fear that smoking opium facilitated sexual
contact between Chinese and white Americans was also a factor
in its total prohibition. Chicanos in the Southwest were be-
lieved to be incited to violence by smoking marihuana. Heroin
was linked in the 1920s with a turbulent age-group: adolescents
in reckless and promiscuous urban gangs. Alcohol was associ-
ated with immigrants crowding into large and corrupt cities. In
each instance, use of a particular drug was attributed to an
identifiable and threatening minority group.80
... Customary use of a certain drug came to symbolize the
difference between that group and the rest of society; eliminat-
ing the drug might alleviate social disharmony and preserve old
order."'
Historically, the prohibition of particular drugs has also been in-
fluenced by racial stereotyping. The connection between Blacks and
cocaine is perhaps the most egregious example. Musto wrote:
[T]he problem of cocaine proceeded from an association with
Negroes in about 1900, when a massive repression and disen-
franchisement were under way in the South, to a convenient
explanation for crime waves .... In each instance there were
ulterior motives to magnify the problem of cocaine among Ne-
groes, and it was to almost no one's personal interest to mini-
mize or portray it objectively. As a result, by 1910 it was not
difficult to get legislation almost completely prohibiting the
drug.82
Such fears also coincided with increased lynchings, legal segrega-
tion, and restrictive voting laws, which Musto contends were part of
a larger scheme to remove political and social power from Blacks. 3
Although racial animus may be one source of racially discriminatory
drug laws, a more complicated factor is the tendency of mainstream
culture to attribute the problems of minority groups to illegal
80. MUSTO, supra note 76, at 244-45. It has also been argued that early anti-
cigarette efforts arose in large part because urban immigrants in the United States
were the first users of cigarettes. Id. at 245.
81. Id.
82. MusTo, supra note 76, at 255 n.15. See also Leiby, supra note 7, at F5 (citing
"Opium-smoking Chinese immigrants" and "reefer-smoking Mexican-American[s]"
as examples of how "[wihen society is threatened by a new scourge, it often finds
easy scapegoats.").
83. MusTo, supra note 76, at 7.
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drugs. 4 In many instances, lawmakers may be unable to compre-
hend the complexity of the crises facing communities of color, or are
unable to imagine effective solutions to them.s5 Consequently, they
objectify and simplify the problems inherent in poverty - unem-
ployment, lack of health care, crime, etc. - and redefine them as
drug problems, which they can pretend to solve through increased
police funding, drug convictions, and incarceration. 6
For example, horror stories of "crack babies" may be the only
means by which policy-makers confront the lack of pre-natal care
being received by many poverty stricken mothers. Surely, the un-
availability of pre-natal care and the appallingly high infant mortal-
ity rate are as shocking as crack babies, but those problems require
more complicated and expensive remedies than the criminaliza-
tion87 or sterilization8 of cocaine-addicted mothers. This myth of
the cocaine-addicted mother also typifies the effect that racial stere-
otyping can have on drug enforcement. Although the media leads
much of the public to believe that "crack mothers" are invariably
Black women,89 studies show that pregnant Black and White women
use drugs at the same rate." Partially as a result of this stereotyp-
ing, doctors are ten times more likely to report a Black woman than
a White woman to child abuse authorities for drug use during
pregnancy.91
When the denial of a drug's destructive effect is politically com-
fortable, i.e., when a majority of the population or a politically pow-
erful sector of society uses the drug, the drug will avoid severe
regulation. Our society's blindness to the destructive effects of alco-
hol is an example. 92 For every American regularly using cocaine,
84. See, e.g., Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 555-59 (describing historical
tendency surrounding "drug scares" to link disparaged drugs to minority popula-
tions). Id.
85. See, e.g., id. at 561-62 (explaining concept of sociological denial as means of
misinterpreting causation of drug abuse).
86. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. Ruv.
1945 (1993); see also powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 561-62.
87. See generally Harris, supra note 52, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 86, at 1961-65.
89. Harris, supra note 52, at Al.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. MrrCHELL, supra note 77, at 14-27.
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there are 100 using alcohol, 93 and alcohol and tobacco are arguably
more dangerous than cocaine, cannabis, or opiates.94
Even absent specific intent to use drug laws to subjugate minority
populations, the lack of objective criteria guiding legislators in drug
classification and penalty determinations allows social and racial bi-
ases to shape drug policies.95 Thus, arbitrary judgments based upon
media-provoked hysteria have become paramount in the establish-
ment of national drug policies.96 Drug classifications are not even
purportedly based on a drug's pharmacological effects. 7 Moreover,
when lawmakers provide statistical and scientific documentation for
their classification and penalty schemes, that documentation is often
distorted by the illegality of drugs98 or biased because much of the
body of scientific data is funded and compiled by agencies such as
the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which have an explicitly anti-
drug agenda.99 It may be that non-pharmacological factors are so
93. Id. at 14.
94. Steve Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the
Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18
HOFSTRA L. REv. 751,752 (1990) (noting that two legal drugs, alcohol and tobacco,
cause more deaths per year than illegal drugs).
95. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 540-41 (asserting theory that media
and politicians focus on crack because of its popularity with lower-class minorities).
Reinarman and Levine stated:
These people tend to have fewer bonds to conventional society, less to lose, and
far fewer resources to cope with or shield themselves from cocaine problems.
The current drug scare thus began in earnest when crack use became visible
among this "threatening" group.
Id.
96. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 539-45.
97. "Because of the statutory equivalences, the ratios in Drug Equivalency Ta-
bles do not necessarily reflect dosages based on pharmacological equivalents."
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2D1.1, commentary to note
10 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
For example, politicians have classified cocaine and marijuana as "narcotics."
MITCHELL, supra note 77, at 26. "In thirteen states marijuana is a narcotic, but in
thirty-seven states it is a hallucinogen. In three states LSD is a narcotic. With equal
justification lawmakers could declare alcohol, caffeine or tobacco to be narcotics.
Indeed, since no scientific rationale need be given by legislators, they could desig-
nate grapefruits or pomegranates as narcotics." Id. at 44 n.122.
98. See Jerry Mandel, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 STAN. L. REv.
991 (1969) (arguing that official drug statistics are often inconclusive or inaccurate
given the variety of state and federal drug classification schemes).
99. Id. at 1029-31 (speculating that "[a]uthorities may maximize the extent of
drug use in order to gain some advantage for their bureaucracy").
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important to the effect of a drug that it is impossible to objectively
classify drugs in terms of pharmacology.10°
The lack of objective criteria available for use in classifying drugs
also allows bias and arbitrary judgments to influence the setting of
penalties for drug convictions. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Harmelin v. Michigan'' upheld a Michigan law requiring a
sentence of life without parole for possession of more than 650
grams of narcotics. The case involved a 45-year-old Air Force vet-
eran" 2 with no prior criminal record.0 3 Harmelin was arrested
with 672 grams of cocaine."°4 In Michigan, the penalty for posses-
sion of 672 grams of cocaine is the same as the penalty for first-
degree murder: life without parole.10 5 The arbitrary nature of the
Michigan statute is significant. If Harmelin had been arrested for
possession of cocaine across the Michigan border in Ohio, his pen-
alty would have been a minimum of 2-5 years and a maximum of 15
years in prison. 0 6
Because we are aware of the war on drugs' racially disparate im-
pact and the subjectivity inherent in drug scheduling and penalty
setting, we have an ethical responsibility to examine our drug pen-
alty schemes for racial discrimination. Given the intractable
100. "Cross-cultural and historical comparisons confirm that our drug classifica-
tions are artificial." MrrcHELL, supra note 77, at 6. Alcohol, opiates, marijuana,
stimulants, and tobacco are among the substances that can be flexibly employed for
medicinal purposes or as "fun drugs." Similarly, different cultures use various meth-
ods of ingestion to obtain distinct effects from drugs. "[Plervasive cultural condi-
tioning" influences both society's choice of drugs and their effects upon society. Id.
at 8.
Reports indicate that "although drugs have specific physiological impact, their ef-
fects upon behavior ... are 'largely nonspecific'... . [i]n various blind studies...
users [are] unable to judge the potency of the drugs being taken and observers [are]
unable to judge what sort of drug a subject took or even whether they took a drug."
Id. at 10.
See also Deborah Maloff et al., Informal Social Controls and Their Influence on
Substance Use, 9 J. DRUG IssuEs 161 (1979) (analyzing how cultural differences be-
tween tribes in Africa lead to widely divergent reactions to the same substance).
101. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). The Court also held that a sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole for a drug offense committed by a first-time offender was not
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2702.
102. Isikoff, supra note 34, at C2.
103. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2684.
105. MAUER, supra note 28, at 10.
106. Id.
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problems with requiring objective justification of culpability for the
entire criminal code, it is perhaps only within this context of demon-
strated abuse that we can demand objective justifications for our
criminal policies. Regardless of the legal or ethical reasoning that
leads us to examine our drug policies for racial discrimination, such
an investigation of enhanced crack penalties demonstrates their ra-
cially discriminatory effect and lack of a rational, non-discriminatory
purpose. The following section of this Article explores the arbitrary
nature and discriminatory impact of enhanced crack penalties, and
argues that these laws violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
III: THE CASE AGAINST ENHANCED CRACK PENALTIES
Media reports of the increasing popularity of crack cocaine sur-
faced in late 1984.1° Within two years, the press labeled crack as
the most dangerous drug, in terms of addictiveness and association
with crime, and decried the outbreak of a national "crack epi-
demic."' °8 Drug czar William Bennett declared that crack is "our
biggest and most immediate problem."'0 9 Congress responded to
this hysteria by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.110 The
Act includes tougher penalties, including mandatory minimum
sentences for many drug offenses, but its most draconian provisions
107. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 541.
108. Id. at 541-43.
109. BARBARA WALLACE, CRACK COCAINE: A PRACTICAL TREATMENT AP-
PROACH FOR THE CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT 9 (1991). Crack was seen as the cause
of "an alarming increase in drive-by shootings and other inner-city crime.. ." Leiby,
supra note 7, at F4.
110. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-978 (1988 & Supp. IV
1993)).
One commentator attributed the intense anti-drug attitude prevalent in the sum-
mer of 1986 in part to the death of basketball star Len Bias, who died as a result of a
cocaine overdose in June 1986:
Horror, outrage and sorrow fueled an anti-drug campaign in a summer when
"crack" was taking hold of the popular imagination-it was often described by
the media as the most addictive, destructive drug ever invented. House
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill returned from his home district of Boston after July
Fourth-the city was stunned at the loss of the young man who was to be their
new basketball star-and announced that House Democrats would develop an
omnibus anti-crime bill. He set a five-week deadline for committee work to
conclude.
Leiby, supra note 7, at F5.
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target offenses involving crack cocaine, referred to in the statutes as
cocaine base."' Despite the similarities between crack cocaine and
cocaine hydrochloride, the powder form of the drug from which
crack is derived, the Act treats crack as one hundred times more
culpable than cocaine hydrochloride."' This equation means that
even petty crack dealers are subject to mandatory minimum prison
sentences."3 Congress also drastically increased the mandatory
penalties for crack violations and added possession of crack to the
list of offenses requiring mandatory minimum sentences." 4 Follow-
ing the leadership and rhetoric of the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions," 5 and in an attempt to find a cure for the problems of their
own inner-cities, state legislatures also adopted statutes dealing spe-
cifically with crack cocaine." 6 These state laws vary dramatically in
their treatment of crack violations, but several provide harsher
sentences for offenses involving crack than for those involving pow-
der cocaine." 7
A. Federal Law
One federal judge wrote that there is "nearly overwhelming statis-
tical evidence that blacks are prosecuted much more frequently and
'disproportionately' for 'crack' violations than whites and that
blacks are consequently much more likely than whites to be sub-
111. Prior to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 841 provided only
for maximum sentences. First offenses involving Schedule I & II controlled sub-
stance narcotics rendered imprisonments of not more than 15 years, and/or a fine of
not more than $25,000. 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1984). After the
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 includes minimum sentences. In general, first offenses involv-
ing more than 5,000 grams of powder cocaine or 50 grams of crack carry a minimum
10-year sentence; subsequent offenses earn at least 20 years. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (1988). First offenses involving 500 grams or more of powder co-
caine or 5 grams or more of cocaine base dictate a 5-year sentence; subsequent of-
fenses earn a minimum of 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988).
112. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986).
113. Bearak, supra note 33, at Al.
114. See supra note 111; compare 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1984)
with 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (1988).
115. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 559-66 (discussing the political
and ideological responses to the media attention given to crack cocaine after 1984).
116. See infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text for an examination of state
crack laws.
117. See infra Appendix.
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jected to harsh sentences under the [federal] 'crack' guidelines
.. 1.8. 8 Between October 2, 1991, and September 30, 1992, over
90% of the defendants prosecuted under federal crack laws were
Black.' 19
At the heart of the controversy over federal crack laws is the use
of a "100 to 1" formula. Under section 1002 of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, which prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, dispen-
sation, or possession with the intent to distribute narcotics, 5 kilo-
grams (5,000 grams) of powder cocaine is equivalent to 50 grams of
crack.121 Violation of section 1002 carries a mandatory minimum
sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of life. 2 ' Similarly, a
violation involving over 500 grams of cocaine or over 5 grams of
crack carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years and a maxi-
mum of 40 years. 22 No person sentenced under these laws is eligi-
ble for parole."z
In addition, mere possession of crack, without the intent to dis-
tribute, now carries a mandatory minimum sentence.' 24 A person
convicted of possessing over 5 grams of crack, even a first-time of-
fender, shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than
118. United States v. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (D. Neb. 1993). The
United States Sentencing Commission is re-examining its crack cocaine guidelines
and their impact on "certain segments of our society." United States v. Majied, No.
8:CR91-00038(02), 1993 WL 315987, at *5 (D. Neb. July 29, 1993). Judge Terry J.
Hatter, a federal district court judge in Los Angeles, has also spoken out against the
100 to 1 ratio, citing it as an example of how sentencing laws target minorities harder
than Whites. DeBenedictis, supra note 7, at 76.
119. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. at 1460-61; Majied, 1993 WL 315987, at *5.
120. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
841(b)(1)(A) (1988)).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988).
122. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
123. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B).
124. Section 844(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a con-
trolled substance ... [any person who violates this [section] may be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, and shall be fined a mini-
mum of $1,000, or both, [except that for subsequent offenses different rules
apply]. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a person convicted under this
[section] for the possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine
base shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more
than 20 years, or both, if the conviction is a first conviction under this [section]
and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 5 grams ...
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (emphasis added).
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20 years.1' The same penalty applies if the defendant has one prior
crack possession conviction and is subsequently caught possessing
over three grams of crack, 26 or if the defendant has two such prior
convictions and is subsequently convicted for possession of over one
gram of crack.' 12 The United States Sentencing Commission also
promulgated a temporary emergency amendment to Guideline Sec-
tion 2D2.1, which creates an automatic presumption of intent to dis-
tribute when a defendant is convicted for possessing more than five
grams of a mixture or substance containing crack.'2 '
The United States Sentencing Guidelines, which set a base of-
fense level largely used to determine sentencing within the statuto-
rily permitted range, also follow the 100 to 1 formula.' 29 Thus, for
purposes of sentencing, an offense involving crack is treated as iden-
tical to the same crime involving one hundred times the quantity of
powder cocaine. This formula is taken to the extreme by equating
an offense involving between 25 grams (almost one ounce) and 50
grams (1 2/3 ounce) of powder cocaine - an amount which almost
certainly indicates dealing - with one involving between 1/4 and 1/2
gram of crack - an amount plausibly for personal use.130
In severe contrast to the harsh federal sentences for crack posses-
sion, a first-time offender possessing any other illicit drug is not sub-
ject to mandatory imprisonment, and faces a maximum sentence of
1 year; a second-time drug offender faces a mandatory minimum
sentence of 15 days, and a maximum of 2 years; a third-time drug
offender faces a mandatory minimum of 90 days, and a maximum of
3 years.131
B. State Laws
A survey of federal and state laws relating to cocaine and crack
demonstrates the arbitrary nature of drug scheduling and penalty
setting, and the resulting potential for abuse. The formulas used by
federal and state laws, when viewed as a class, fail to reflect an ob-
125. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 54 Fed. Reg. 46,032 (1989).
129. United States Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1993).
130. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(15).
131. 21 U.S.C. § 844; see also supra note 124.
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jective culpability level of crack offenses compared to cocaine of-
fenses, or any other objective characteristics of crack.
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act' 3" appeared in 1970 as a
state statutory complement to the federal Controlled Substances
Act.133 All states have adopted the flexible uniform act, which al-
lows the states to name their own penalties.' Several states
amended their version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act to
reflect the increased crack penalties provided by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986. An inventory of each state's crack statutes
reveals that Iowa and North Dakota followed the lead of the federal
government and treat 1 gram of crack as equivalent to 100 grams of
cocaine.135 Maryland enacted a 90 to 1 ratio. 36 Missouri adopted a
75 to 1 ratio,'13 7 while Connecticut employs a 56 to I ratio.138 The
132. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANcES Acr, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1990). The Prefatory
Note states:
A main objective of this Uniform Act is to create a coordinated and codified
system of drug control, similar to that utilized at the Federal level, which classi-
fies all narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs subject to control into five
schedules, with each schedule having its own criteria for drug placement. This
classification system will enable the agency charged with implementing it to add,
delete or reschedule substances based upon new scientific findings and the abuse
potential of the substance.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
133. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-970 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
134. See supra note 132.
135. IOWA CODE § 204.401 (West Supp. 1993) (using 100:1 ratio in determining
the class of felony and penalty); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23.1.1(c) (1991) (pro-
viding that a person who commits a drug offense involving over 500 grams of co-
caine or over 5 grams of crack is subject to increased penalties; this aggravating
factor will cause the court to treat the felony for punishment purposes as one class
above that which it would be absent the aggravating factor).
136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(f) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (providing if a person
is convicted of manufacturing, distributing, possessing with the intent to manufac-
ture or distribute over 448 grams of cocaine or over 50 grams of crack, they will be
sentenced according to other sections, except they will receive a minimum of 5 years
imprisonment without parole).
137. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.222 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (providing that a person
who manufactures or distributes 150-450 grams of cocaine, or 2-6 grams of crack,
shall be sentenced to the authorized term of imprisonment for a Class A Felony; if
such crime involves more than 450 grams of cocaine or 6 grams of crack, the sen-
tence shall be served without probation or parole); id. § 195.223 (providing that a
person who possesses or has under his control, purchases or attempts to purchase, or
brings into the state 150-450 grams of cocaine, or 2-6 grams of crack, shall be guilty
of a Class B Felony; if such crime involves more than 450 grams of cocaine or 6
grams of crack, the person shall be guilty of a Class A Felony).
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District of Columbia uses a 10 to 1 ratio,139 Nebraska uses a 7 to 1
ratio,'14 and Oklahoma uses roughly a 6 to 1 ratio.14' Finally, Cali-
fornia uses a 2 to 1 ratio.' 42 Some states employ methods other than
138. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278(a) (West 1993) (providing that any per-
son who manufactures, distributes, transports, or possesses with intent to dispense,
gives or administers 1 ounce or more of cocaine or one-half gram or more of crack,
and who is not drug dependent at the time, shall be imprisoned for a minimum term
of not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years; the mandatory minimum sentence
shall not be suspended except if the defendant is under 18 or had significantly im-
paired mental capacity).
139. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541 (1993) (providing that a person who manufac-
tures, distributes, or possesses with the intent of distributing over 500 grams of co-
caine, or over 50 grams of crack, shall receive a mandatory minimum sentence of not
less than 5 years for the first offense and 10 years for the second or subsequent
offense; if that crime involves less than 500 grams of cocaine, the minimum
mandatory sentence shall be 5 years for the first offense, 8 years for the second
offense, and 10 years for the third or subsequent offense; if that crime involves less
than 50 grams of crack, the mandatory minimum sentence shall be 4 years for the
first offense, 7 years for the second offense, and 10 years for the third or subsequent
offense; no person serving a mandatory-minimum term prescribed in this chapter
shall be released on parole, granted probation, or granted a suspended sentence
prior to serving such mandatory-minimum sentence).
See also ALA. CODE § 12-35-5 (1993) (providing that application from drug of-
fender to enter into drug rehabilitation in lieu of drug prosecution shall not be ac-
cepted when the offense involved more than 5 grams of cocaine hydrochloride or
more than 500 milligrams (1/2 gram) crack).
140. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-416 (Supp. 1992) (providing that any person who
manufactures, distributes, possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver more than
7 ounces of cocaine, or more than 28 grams of crack, shall be guilty of a class IC
Felony; if that crime involves between 1-7 ounces of cocaine, or between 10-28
grams of crack, it shall be a Class ID Felony; persons serving sentences for such
crimes involving crack or cocaine shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving the
mandatory minimum sentence).
141. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-415 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any
person who "traffics" over 28 grams of cocaine or over 5 grams of crack shall be
fined between $25,000 and $100,000; any person who "traffics" over 300 grams of
cocaine or over 50 grams of crack shall be fined between $100,000 and $500,000; in
addition to these fines, the defendant convicted of crimes involving the above
amounts of controlled substances shall be punished by a term of imprisonment pro-
vided for in Section 2-401 of this title; if the person has previously been convicted of
a drug felony, they shall be imprisoned for twice that length; if the person has previ-
ously been twice convicted of a drug felony, they shall get life without parole; none
of the above sentences are eligible for probation, parole, suspended sentence, or
appeal bonds).
142. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351 (West 1991) (imposing sentences
for cocaine of 2-4 years); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5 (West 1993)
(imposing sentences for crack of 3-5 years); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11370.1 (West 1991) (providing that every person who unlawfully possesses one-
half gram or less of a substance containing cocaine-base, or 1 gram or less of cocaine
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or in addition to a skewed ratio to enhance crack penalties. These
methods include: classifying crack without reference to cocaine,143
making drug purity an aggravating factor in sentencing guide-
lines, 14" and codifying distinct crack offenses. 45
The common denominator among these state laws is that they as-
sume violations involving crack deserve greater punishment than
those involving powder cocaine and they punish the offenses accord-
ingly. Most states even provide mandatory minimum sentences,
without possibility of parole or probation, to first-time dealers
while in immediate personal possession of a loaded, operable firearm is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 2-4 years); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.073 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any person who is convicted of
the following crimes shall not be granted probation or suspended sentence except in
unusual circumstances: possessing for sale 28.5 grams or more of cocaine or 14.25
grams or more of cocaine base; transporting or importing for sale cocaine base; or
selling or offering to sell cocaine base).
143. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:967 (West 1992) (providing that production or
manufacturing of amphetamine, methamphetamine, or cocaine base shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 20 years nor more than 50
years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and in addi-
tion, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than $500,000; any other controlled
dangerous substance classified in Schedule II shall be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment at hard labor for not more than 10 years; and, in addition, may be sentenced
to pay a fine of not more than $15,000).
144. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. § 19-03.1-23.1 (1991), supra note 135.
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (Any person pos-
sessing or attempting to possess less than 1 gram of crack is guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction for a first offense, must be imprisoned for a term of 2-5 years
and fined not less than $5,000. For a second offense, the offender is guilty of a
felony and must be imprisoned for 4-7 years and fined not less than $10,000. For a
third or subsequent offense, the offender is guilty of a felony and must be impris-
oned for 10-15 years and fined not less than $15,000.).
Any person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or aids and abets the
same, or possesses with intent to distribute crack is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction for a first offense, must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty years and fined not less than
twenty-five thousand dollars. For a second offense, the offender must be im-
prisoned for not less than twenty-five years nor more than thirty years and fined
not less than fifty thousand dollars. Possession of one or more grams of crack is
prima facie evidence of a violation of the manufacture, distribution, etc. subsec-
tion. Anyone who commits the former crime with amounts involving more than
100 grams or more of crack is guilty of a felony known as trafficking and, upon
conviction, must be punished by a mandatory term of imprisonment of twenty-
five years and a fine of fifty thousand dollars. Except for the crime of posses-
sion of crack, sentences for violation of this provision may not be suspended
and probation may not be granted.
Id.
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whose crimes involve very small amounts of crack. 146 The
mandatory minimum sentence for these small time offenders can be
as long as fifteen years. 47 A few states also impose harsh sentences
on individuals convicted of mere possession of crack.148
The most serious disparity which results from many of these stat-
utes is that crack users and small-time crack dealers are given
lengthy mandatory minimum prison terms, while larger volume
powder cocaine dealers escape with stayed sentences and probation.
In fact, cocaine dealers in some states would literally have to traffic
between an ounce and a pound of powder cocaine in order to be
subject to mandatory minimum sentences.149
C. Ethnography of Crack Users
Government statistics reveal a significant correlation between
ethnicity and preference for crack or powder cocaine. The National
Institute on Drug Abuse found that "[iun general, lifetime use [of
crack] was more common among males, blacks, residents of large
metropolitan areas, residents of the West, those with less education,
and the unemployed."' Of the U.S. household population, 1.4%
reported having ever used crack cocaine, 0.5% reported using crack
in the past year, and 0.2% reported using crack in the past month.' 51
146. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.073 (West Supp. 1993) (possessing for
sale over 14.25 grams, selling, or offering to sell any amount); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 21a-278(a) (West 1993) (over one half gram); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541 (1993)
(less than 50 grams); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.222 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (over 6 grams);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Supp. 1992) (over 10 grams); OKrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2-415 (West Supp. 1993) (over 5 grams); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1992) (any amount).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
148. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.223 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (possession of 2-6
grams of crack shall be a Class A Felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1993) (possession of any amount, upon first offense, must be imprisoned
for between 2 and 5 years; upon second offense, between 4 and 7 years; for a third
offense, between 10 and 15 years).
149. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278(a) (West 1993) (over 1 ounce
of cocaine to obtain mandatory 5 year sentence); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(o
(1992 & Supp. 1993) (over 448 grams of cocaine to obtain mandatory 5 year sen-
tence); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.222 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (over 450 grams of cocaine
to be ineligible for parole or probation); NEB. REV.. STAT. § 28-416 (Supp. 1992) (1-
7 ounces of cocaine).
150. NATIONAL INsTrruTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 51 (1990) [hereinafter MAIN FINDINGS].
151. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 40, at 29.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/5
IS RACISM INHERENT IN CRACK COCAINE LAWS?
Lifetime crack use rates of more than 5% were found only among
18- to 25-year-olds who lived in Western states or had no high school
diploma, and for 26- to 34-year-olds who were Black or unem-
ployed.15 2 The complete demographic statistics are presented in Ta-
ble 1.
An analysis of these government statistics reveals that a much
higher percentage of Black cocaine users than White cocaine users
ingest cocaine in the form of crack. Among the household popula-
tion aged 12 and older, 11.7% of Whites, 10% of Blacks, and 11.5%
of Latinos had ever used cocaine as of 1990.153 In contrast, 1.1% of
Whites, 3.1% of Blacks, and 1.6% of Latinos had used crack.
154
Thus, slightly over 9% of Whites who had used cocaine had tried
crack, whereas 31% of Blacks and 14% of Latinos who had used
cocaine had tried crack. The correlation between race and prefer-
ence for crack or cocaine is even more obvious among more recent
cocaine users: only 14% of Whites using cocaine in the past year
used crack during that time. Meanwhile, 42% of Blacks using co-
caine used crack during that time.155
This preference results in enhanced penalties, often including
mandatory minimum prison sentences, being imposed on a dispro-
portionate number of Black and Latino cocaine users. In addition
to the disparate impact on these two minority groups, there may be
similar adverse results with respect to other minority groups. Such
results are impossible to assess because of the lack of relevant gov-
ernment statistics. The following section explores rationales behind
enhanced crack penalties which could justify the disparate treatment
of certain minority groups.
152. MAIN FINDINGS, supra note 150, at 51.
153. Id. at 47.
154. Id. at 59, tbl. 4.8.
155. These figures assume that all respondents who used crack during the period
also acknowledged use of cocaine during the period. The survey did not track over-
lap of these two samples, but one can assume a substantial overlap. The correlation
between race and preference is significant even absent overlap: 8.5% of Whites and
23.6% of Blacks who had ever used cocaine in some form had used crack, and 12.5%
of Whites and 30% of Blacks who had used some form of cocaine in the past year
had used crack during that time. MAIN FiNDINGS, supra note 150, at 59.
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE REPORTING COCAINE/CRACK USE BY
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 1990
Cocaine Cocaine Crack Crack
Demographic Use in Use In Use in Use in
Information Lifetime Past Year Lifetime Past Year
Total 11.3% 3.1% 1.4% 0.5%
Sex
Male 13.8% 4.3% 2.0% 0.8%
Female 9.0% 2.0% 0.8% 0.3%
Race
White 11.7% 2.8% 1.1% 0.4%
Black 10.0% 4.0% 3.1% 1.7%
Hispanic 11.5% 5.2% 1.6% *
Pop. Density
Lg. metro 13.2% 3.8% 1.9% 0.7%
Sm. metro 11.7% 3.0% 1.1% 0.3%
Non-metro 6.9% 2.0% 0.9% 0.4%
Adult Education
Not HS grad. 7.3% 3.0% 1.5% 0.7%
HS grad. 12.0% 3.3% 1.7% 0.5%
Some college 16.1% 4.2% 1.5% 0.6%
College grad. 14.8% 2.3% 0.7% *
Employment
Full-Time 16.5% 4.0% 1.8% 0.7%
Part-Time 11.3% 2.4% 0.9% *
Unemployed 19.8% 9.1% 3.2% 1.3%
* Low precision; no estimate reported.
Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse: Main Findings 52-60 (compilation of Graphs 4.1, 4.2, 4.8, and 4.9) (1990).
D. Searching for a Rational Basis for Enhanced Crack Penalties:
History and Pharmacology
To overcome a federal Equal Protection Clause challenge, the
government need only articulate a legitimate purpose for the chal-
lenged legislation and a reasonable belief that such legislation would
promote the purpose.'5 6 In essence, under federal equal protection
principles, the government may prevail on the strength of any ra-
156. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 668 (1981).
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tional reason for treating crack and powder cocaine differently.15 7
The standard is satisfied by the mere fact that the two drugs have
different physical forms or means of ingestion. However, it is un-
likely that there are sufficient distinctions between crack and pow-
der cocaine to justify enhanced crack penalties under a more
probing constitutional inquiry. Examination of the chemical sub-
stance, pharmacology, and distribution of crack indicates that crack
and powder cocaine are in fact not substantially distinct drugs.
Smoking cocaine only recently became a popular means of
ingesting the drug.'5 8 Both illicit and medicinal uses of cocaine his-
torically relied upon the water-soluble salt, usually cocaine hydro-
chloride.' 59 In the mid-1970s, the drug community in California
introduced a new ritual: a process called free-basing.160 By 1980,
reports of cocaine smoking surfaced throughout the United
States.161 The deterrent against free-basing for most cocaine users
was that converting cocaine hydrochloride to its free-base form was
a do-it-yourself process which required volatile solvents to "free"
the pure cocaine base from the impure cocaine hydrochloride. 62
The introduction of crack cocaine - a precooked, ready-to-use
form of cocaine base - provided a convenient alternative.163
Crack, now the most widely used form of cocaine base,'" is pro-
duced by a relatively simple process that requires only water, baking
soda, and a microwave oven. 65 Cocaine hydrochloride is mixed
with a solution containing an excess of sodium bicarbonate - usu-
ally baking soda - and heated to evaporate the fluid.'66 The heat-
ing process produces cocaine base in a bicarbonate crystalline
mixture. Cocaine base melts at a much lower temperature than the
157. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fed-
eral rational basis standard.
158. Reese T. Jones, The Pharmacology of Cocaine Smoking in Humans, in NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No. 99: RESEARCH
FINDINGS ON SMOKING OF ABUSED SUBSTANCES 30,30-31 (C. Nora Chiang & Rich-
ard L. Hawks eds., 1990); WALLACE, supra note 109, at 5-6.
159. WALLACE, supra note 109, at 4-5.
160. Id. at 5-6.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id.
164. WALLACE, supra note 109, at 6-10.
165. Jones, supra note 158, at 31; WALLACE, supra note 109, at 9.
166. Jones, supra note 158, at 31.
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salt (about 80 degrees C. compared to 180 degrees C.) and then
boils, producing an inhalable aerosol. 6 7 Despite the different
modes of preparation, smoking crack, therefore, is essentially smok-
168ing cocaine.
In addition to the similar chemistry of crack and cocaine, the
pharmacological effects of the two drugs are similar.169 Because co-
caine hydrochloride can be ingested by various methods, including
intravenously, without being subject to enhanced crack penalties,
this discussion includes data from intravenous (IV) cocaine inges-
tion. To the extent that the pharmacological effects caused by vari-
ous modes of ingestion differ, they highlight the central question of
this section: Why is the process of smoking cocaine singled out for
aggravated punishments while other forms of ingestion - including
IV, which is arguably the most dangerous - are not? 70
The effects of cocaine use, whether smoked, snorted, or injected,
"include euphoria, increased energy, enhanced alertness and sen-
sory experience, and elevated feelings of self-esteem and self-confi-
dence.' 17 ' In a study of cocaine effects, subjects who ingested
cocaine through the IV method achieved a subjective "high" signifi-
cantly more intense than those who smoked the cocaine.' 72 The
smokers' highs "peaked" after one minute, while the highs of those
who used the IV route peaked four minutes after ingestion.173
Both peaks were short lived, however, and the high dramatically de-
creased within twenty to forty minutes. 74 In contrast, those who
snorted cocaine achieved a high only one-half as intense as the
167. Id.
168. Id. at 30. See also Leiby, supra note 7, at F4 (comparing crack and cocaine
and concluding that: "lit is all the same stuff. Identical molecules.").
169. However, it is conceded that "relatively little has been published describing
the human pharmacology of cocaine smoking." Id. at 32. Also, there are method-
ological challenges in studying the effects of cocaine smoking. For example, it is
almost impossible to know exactly how much of the smoked cocaine is actually being
absorbed in the body. Id. at 31-32.
170. See infra note 253 and accompanying text for the treatment of this issue in
State v. Russell.
171. WALLAcE, supra note 109, at 10.
172. The subjects were asked to monitor the intensity of their "high" in compari-
son to a sober state and the most intoxicated they have ever been from cocaine
ingestion. Jones, supra note 158, at 36, fig. 4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
150
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smokers, and their high did not peak until approximately twenty
minutes after ingestion. 75 The effects from snorted cocaine
lingered for over two hours.' 76 Snorting cocaine produces a lower
subjective high, despite its higher plasma level, because neuroadap-
tion (tolerance) to cocaine develops concurrently with the onset of
the drug's effect. 177 Therefore, the longer the ingestion takes to
"peak," the less intense the subjective "high" will be. When com-
paring the effects of different modes of ingesting cocaine by analyz-
ing the level of cocaine which reaches the brain - called the mean
cocaine plasma level 178 - the results show that IV ingestion pro-
duces the highest mean cocaine plasma level, achieved at the quick-
est rate.179 Although plasma level peaks earlier when cocaine is
smoked than when it is snorted, snorting eventually causes the level
to rise higher.' 80
The cardiovascular changes resulting from crack ingestion are
similar to those resulting after equivalent cocaine doses adminis-
tered by an IV or snorted.'8 For example, the mean heart rate in-
crease and the time to maximum increase are: 46 Beats Per Minute
(BPM) after 10 minutes for IV users; 32 BPM after 2 minutes for
smokers; and 26 BPM after 40 minutes for those who snorted.'8 2
Although crack and cocaine produce some different effects, in-
cluding intensity of the high and plasma levels, there is no pharma-
cological evidence indicating that crack is more dangerous than
powder cocaine. One judge stated that "the evidence is clear that
the cocaine molecule is the same whether the drug being used is in
powder form or in crack form, and is not inherently more dangerous
in crack form."'1 3 Conclusive evidence of crack's increased danger
would certainly strengthen the case for enhanced penalties. Despite
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Rapidly developing tolerance of cocaine has been demonstrated by plotting
plasma level against subjective intoxication rating over the term of the drug's effect.
Jones, supra note 158, at 35-36.
178. The two plasma cocaine levels monitored are venous and arterial. These
two levels bear a relationship to the level of cocaine in the brain. Id. at 33.
179. Id. at 35, fig. 3.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 32.
182. Jones, supra note 158, at 38, tbl. 1.
183. Majied, 1993 WL 315987, at *5.
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the lack of evidence regarding the relative dangers of crack and co-
caine, lawmakers and some judges18" have assumed that crack is
more dangerous and used this assumption to support or uphold en-
hanced crack penalties.
In addition to pharmacology, there are a number of other justifi-
cations asserted on behalf of enhanced crack penalties.185 One such
justification is that distributors of crack are somehow in a more
"cevil" line of work than are the distributors of cocaine. However,
cocaine distributors may actually be more powerful than crack dis-
tributors in the drug distribution chain because all crack is made out
of cocaine. This means that every crack sale both relies upon and
generates profits for cocaine distributors. These profits have in-
creased since 1985 as cocaine prices have decreased and purities
have increased, while the price and purity of crack have remained
stable.186
Additionally, crack purchasers, whether buying for personal use
or petty dealing, are relatively disempowered within the drug distri-
bution network. The common belief that crack is less expensive
than powder cocaine is inaccurate. Crack is sold in relatively small
quantities, allowing even the very poor to purchase crack, whereas
powder cocaine is usually sold in significantly larger and more ex-
184. Federal judges have differed as to whether crack is more dangerous. One
judge stated that "the evidence is clear that the cocaine molecule is the same
whether the drug being used is in powder form or in crack form, and is not inher-
ently more dangerous in crack form." Majied, 1993 WL 315987, at *5. Another
judge noted that "there was a substantial body of medical evidence presented to me
which would indicate that 'crack' is particularly dangerous." McMurray, 833 F.
Supp. at 1460 n.6 (relying on unnamed medical reports linking crack to strokes, re-
spiratory problems, and other medical and behavioral complications).
185. Three of these justifications will be discussed briefly in the context of the
Russell decision in Part IV. See infra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
186. Maurice Rinfret, Cocaine Price, Purity, and Trafficking Trends, in NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No. 110: THE EPIDE.
MIOLOGY OF COCAINE USE AND ABUSE 297-98 (Susan Schober & Charles Schade
eds., 1991). "In 1982, the national wholesale price for a kilogram of cocaine hydro-
chloride ranged from $47,000 to $70,000; [in 1988], the national price range[d] from
$10,000 to $38,000 per kilogram, the lowest price reported to date." Id. at 297. Dur-
ing the same years in Los Angeles, the price decreased from a range of $55,000 to
$70,000, to the lowest price of anywhere in the country, $10,000 to $16,000. Id. at
297-98. Meanwhile, purity levels of cocaine hydrochloride "increased from an aver-
age of 50 to 60 percent in 1982 to roughly 80 percent, while purity at the street or
gram level has about doubled during this same timeframe from 35 to 70 percent."
Id. at 298.
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pensive quantities.187 However, the street price per gram of the two
substances is often equal, and in some cases crack is higher.188 Fur-
thermore, crack purchasers usually do not receive quantity discounts
like cocaine purchasers. 89 Consequently, if we equate culpability to
one's power within the drug marketplace, crack users and small time
distributors are and should be treated as less culpable than cocaine
distributors and crack manufacturers.
The constitutionality of enhanced crack penalties ultimately de-
pends on the degree of the distinction between crack and powder
cocaine required by the applicable constitutional standard. For in-
stance, a constitutional test merely requiring some distinction be-
tween the two substances can be easily met. On the other hand, if a
more intense rational basis standard were applied - perhaps re-
quiring substantial evidence that crack is significantly more danger-
ous than cocaine - the penalty scheme would probably be
unconstitutional. While different in form, crack and powder cocaine
are not demonstrably different in terms of chemical substance, phar-
macological effects, or distribution. There is insufficient evidence to
prove that smoking crack is significantly more dangerous than snort-
ing cocaine. Therefore, the wide disparity of penalties between
crack and cocaine violations would not be justified under a probing
rational basis inquiry.
IV: CHALLENGING ENHANCED CRACK PENALTIES
Because enhanced crack penalties unjustifiably over-incarcerate
Black and Latino cocaine users, these penalties strongly suggest a
violation of equal protection. Unfortunately, enhanced crack penal-
ties are repeatedly upheld under current applications of federal
equal protection. 1' 9 After summarizing the failure of federal equal
protection principles, the remainder of this Article explores the pos-
sibility that a probing rational basis standard under state constitu-
tional law could be used to challenge enhanced crack penalties.
187. WALLACE, supra note 109, at 6.
188. Rinfret, supra note 186, at 297-98.
189. Id.
190. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the sentencing
guidelines of the United States Sentencing Commission).
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A. The Failure of Federal Equal Protection
This Article does not advocate the legalization of crack or co-
caine,191 but instead argues for equal protection challenges to crack
penalties based on the disparate treatment of two similarly situated
populations of cocaine users. In other words, assuming arguendo
that cocaine use is wrong and should be punished, the principles of
equal protection demand that all cocaine users be treated equally,
regardless of race or ethnicity.
The Supreme Court has articulated various standards of review
for practices challenged as violations of the federal Equal Protection
Clause, including strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,a92 and ra-
tional basis scrutiny. The Court subjects practices which impair
"fundamental rights"'193 or are based upon "suspect classifications"
to strict scrutiny. As to suspect classifications, the Supreme Court
has held that statutes which purposefully discriminate against mi-
191. For drug decriminalization arguments, see, e.g., David R. Henderson, A
Humane Economist's Case for Drug Legalization, 24 U.C. DAvis L. Rtv. 655
(1991). See generally Symposium on Drug Decriminalization, 18 HOESTRA L. REv.
457 (1990).
192. Intermediate or "heightened" scrutiny is traditionally applied to gender
classifications. The Court originally applied rational basis in gender cases, which
resulted in several decisions upholding gender classifications. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Flor-
ida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a law including women on a jury list only upon a
woman's special request); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sustaining a law
which prohibited most women from obtaining bartender's licenses).
The Court first articulated their current standard of review of gender classifica-
tions in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). At issue in Craig was a state statute
prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under
18. The Court stated that "classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives." Id. at 197 (emphasis added). See generally John S. Lapham, Comment,
Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges Under United States v. DeGross, 43 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 465, 471-72 n.43 (summarizing applications of strict and
intermediate scrutiny as applied to race- and gender-based discrimination).
193. The Court defines "fundamental rights" as those which the Constitution
explicitly guarantees (e.g., the right to vote and the right to interstate travel) or
those which the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee but are both important
and implicitly granted by the Constitution (e.g., the right to privacy). See, e.g., Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny in a case involving
the fundamental right of interstate movement); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (noting that the right to vote is a fundamental right, restriction
of which must be closely scrutinized); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(recognizing the "zones of privacy" implicitly created by various amendments to the
Constitution).
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nority groups who have been historically subject to oppression con-
stitute an equal protection violation.' 94
Purposeful discrimination may be proven in three ways: (1) the
law is discriminatory on its face;' 95 (2) the law, though facially neu-
tral, is administered in a discriminatory manner;' 96 or (3) the law,
though neutral on its face and as applied, was passed with discrimi-
natory intent, as established by circumstantial evidence such as ad-
verse impact."9 A challenged practice may only survive strict
scrutiny if the government proves that the classification is necessary
to promote a compelling government interest.' 98
Conversely, the Court applies the rational basis standard to those
laws which are not based upon suspect classifications and do not
194. Suspect classifications recognized by the Court include those based on race,
see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), ethnic origin, see, e.g., Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), alienage, see, e.g., Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 305 (1971), and legitimacy, see, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 301 U.S. 68
(1968).
195. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that a stat-
ute excluding Blacks from jury duty was facially discriminatory and therefore an
equal protection violation).
196. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a facially-
neutral ordinance regulating the issuance of laundry permits was applied in discrimi-
natory manner against Chinese-Americans).
197. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that adverse
impact may be a factor in establishing a claim of discriminatory intent, but cannot, in
and of itself, be used to prove equal protection violation absent proof of discrimina-
tory intent); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (holding that party asserting
equal protection violation has burden of proving existence of discriminatory intent
on the part of alleged violator).
198. The Supreme Court has long looked harshly upon statutes which purpose-
fully discriminate against racial minorities. The Court first recognized racial minori-
ties as "discrete and insular minorities," a classification which calls for strict judicial
scrutiny, in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938):
Nor need we enquire... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 153 n.4 (quoting Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)).
When the Court subjects a practice to strict scrutiny, the defending party must
prove that the practice is the only alternative to achieve an essential government
purpose. One commentator referred to this type of scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
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impede fundamental rights.199 Rational basis requires only that the
classification bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest.2" If the classification has some reasonable basis, it is not
unconstitutional merely because it produces some inequality. 10
Minority criminal defendants have argued that the disparity be-
tween sentences for cocaine convictions and sentences for crack
convictions, although facially neutral, have an adverse impact on ra-
cial minorities 2 and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny.
Virtually every federal court with the opportunity to address this
argument has rejected it, often noting that the challenger had failed
199. The Court uses rational basis review to evaluate general economic and so-
cial regulations. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding an
ordinance banning certain food vendors); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding Texas system of financing public education);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (sustaining Maryland Aid to Families
with Dependent Children scheme regarding maximum amounts of aid); Railway Ex-
press Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sustaining ban on certain advertis-
ing on vehicles in New York). See generally Edward L. Barrett, The Rational Basis
Standard for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 Ky.
L.L 845 (1980).
200. To satisfy the "mere rationality" test, "the Courts must reach and determine
the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of
its purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Commentators have
argued that "the traditional deference to legislative purposes and legislative selec-
tions among means continues on the whole to make the rationality requirement
largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1442-43 (2d ed. 1988).
201. In the context of enhanced crack penalties, the Fifth Circuit summarized:
In order to establish a valid equal protection claim... more than simply dispro-
portionate impact must be shown. "Even if a neutral law has a disproportion-
ately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory
purpose." Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that
the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part because
of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifi-
able group.
United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992) (re-
jecting defendants' adverse impact argument - which the defendants used in at-
tempt to prove that crack cocaine provisions of sentencing guidelines violated equal
protection rights of Black defendants - because even if adverse impact existed,
there was no indicia of discriminatory intent in the legislative history). Accord
United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concerning irrationality
of sentencing guidelines); United States v. Madison, 781 F. Supp. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (same).
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to prove that enhanced crack penalties resulted from purposeful dis-
crimination.20 3 Absent such proof, courts review equal protection
challenges to crack cocaine laws under the rational basis test.2°4 Al-
most all courts have held that the disparity in sentencing is not an
equal protection violation because it is rationally related to the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in public health and safety.205
For the first time, a federal district court recently held that the
100:1 ratio violates the U.S. Constitution's equal protection guaran-
tee,2" and in doing so "present[ed] a novel legal analysis of the ad-
verse impact on blacks resulting from the imposition [of the 100:1
ratio]." 20 7 In this case, United States v. Clary,208 Judge Clyde S. Ca-
hill of the Eastern District of Missouri presented a thorough back-
ground of racism in America generally,20 9 and in particular, the
racism inherent in our society's attempt to control crime. 10
Judge Cahill began his constitutional discussion by mandating that
equal protection analysis consider unconscious racism by legislators
203. Criminal defendants have been unable to prove governmental discrimina-
tory intent. See, e.g., Galloway, 951 F.2d at 65-66 (finding no indicia of purposeful
discriminatory intent by Congress).
204. See, e.g., Galloway, 951 F.2d at 66 (applying rational basis test). Accord
Cyrus, 890 F.2d at 1248 (finding rational basis apparent in that crack is more addic-
tive, cheaper, more readily available, and more popular than powder cocaine).
205. The shallow scope and conclusory nature of the Galloway court's analysis of
this test demonstrates its weakness. The court in Galloway stated:
Applying the rational basis test to the challenged guideline in the instant case,
the district court properly found that the one hundred to one ratio of cocaine to
cocaine base in the sentencing guidelines was rationally related to Congress'
objective of protecting the public welfare.
Galloway, 951 F.2d at 66. Cf. United States v. Majied, No. 8:CR92-00012, 1993 WL
315987 (D. Neb. July 29, 1993).
206. United States v. Clary, No. 89-167-CR(4) (E.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 1994). See
also Tim Bryant, Judge Voids Crack Law's Heavier Penalties, St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, Feb. 27, 1994, at D1 (discussing the Clary decision). Because this decision
was publicized immediately prior to publication of volume 45 of the Washington
University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law, the discussion of Clary in this
Article is brief [Editor's note].
207. Clary, slip op. at 4.
208. In Clary, the defendant, a Black man, was arrested for possession with in-
tent to distribute 67.76 grams of crack, id. at 1, an offense punishable under 21
U.S.C. § 841 by a mandatory 10-year prison sentence. Id. Judge Cahill gave the
defendant a four-year prison sentence after finding the crack law unconstitutional.
Bryant, supra note 206, at D3.
209. Clary, slip op. at 14-20.
210. Id. at 4-8, 10-14.
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and other government actors.2 1 With this said, Judge Cahill deter-
mined that the crack sentencing law burdens Blacks disproportion-
ately2 12 and that the law can be "traced to racial considerations,"
albeit unconscious. 213 Because of this "de facto suspect classifica-
tion, 21 4 Judge Cahill applied strict scrutiny, which requires a com-
pelling government interest and a law narrowly tailored to satisfy
this interest.21 5 Judge Cahill found neither of these with respect to
the 100:1 ratio. First, he rejected the government's asserted compel-
ling interest that crack must be treated more severely than cocaine
because crack is much more dangerous than cocaine.2 16 Second,
Judge Cahill held that the law is not narrowly tailored because pow-
der cocaine, the derivative source of crack, should be punished at
least as severely as crack.21 7
Unfortunately, Judge Cahill appears pessimistic about the chance
of his opinion surviving on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.21 8 Regardless of the final disposition of the Clary case,
211. Id. at 20-27. Judge Cahill rejected the idea that overt racism caused the
enhanced crack law, but recognized that "unconscious feelings of difference and su-
periority still live on even in well-intentioned minds." Id. at 22.
212. 1L at 40-45 (citing statistics from the Eastern District of Missouri indicating
that of 57 crack convictions between 1989-92, 55 defendants were Black, 1 Hispanic,
and 1 White).
213. Id. at 38. Judge Cahill summarized the evidence of racism in enactment of
the crack laws as follows:
Objective evidence supports the belief that racial animus was a motivating
factor in enacting the crack statute. Congress' decision was based, in large part,
on the racial imagery generated by the media which connected the "crack
problems" with blacks in the inner city. Congress deviated from procedural
patterns, departed from a thorough, rational discussion of the "crack issue" and
reacted to it in a "frenzy" initiated by the media and emotionally charged
constituents.
Id.
214. Clary, slip op. at 45.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 46-49. The government "offered evidence that members of Congress
considered crack to be more dangerous because of its potency, its highly addictive
nature, its affordability, and increasing prevalence." Id. at 46 (footnote omitted).
Judge Cahill discussed "ample" medical and other evidence that rebutted the gov-
ernment's assertion. Id at 46-49.
217. Clary, slip op. at 49. "To impose a more severe penalty on a derivative
source of an illegal narcotic while the principal source of the drug is tolerated is
illogical." Id.
218. Id. at 53. See also Bryant, supra note 206 (stating that "Cahill acknowl-
edged in a 58-page order that his decision might be overruled."). Judge Cahill ap-
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Judge Cahill accurately noted its surviving value: "Even if appellate
review points to a different path, the evaluation and reflection that
this perplexing problem has occasioned is of great value. It will not
have been in vain., 2 19
Criminal defendants have also repeatedly argued that the 100 to 1
ratio established by the federal drug statutes and sentencing guide-
lines violates the due process rights of Black defendants. 2 ° In
United States v. Galloway,221 a representative federal appellate case,
the Fifth Circuit denied the due process challenge based on a dis-
tinction between crack and cocaine. The Galloway court relied on
its prior reasoning in United States v. Thomas222 and restated:
Cocaine base is a different drug from cocaine, and, because it is
prepared for inhalation, concentrates and magnifies the effect
of one gram of cocaine to such a degree that dealers profitably
can sell it in very cheap yet still-potent quantities. Treating the
two substances differently thus is not a due process violation, as
when cocaine is changed into cocaine base, it becomes a differ-
ent chemical substance. Congress need not treat dissimilar
drugs similarly.2'
parently has good reason to be pessimistic: The Eighth Circuit has rejected
constitutional challenges to the crack law at least seven times since 1989. Clary, slip
op. at 3 n.3.
219. Clary, slip op. at 53.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that crack cocaine provisions of sentencing guidelines did not violate due process
rights of Black defendants). Accord United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1090
(5th Cir.) (holding different penalty treatment of crack and cocaine rational because
crack is different chemical substance), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1991); United
States v. Thrner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir.) (holding penalty scheme rational),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230 (1991); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-80
(8th Cir. 1990) (citing Congressional testimony as to crack's potency, addictiveness,
affordability, and prevalence); United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2d
Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that possibility of a stricter penalty which defendant
was not aware of violated due process, and holding that government must prove
defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed crack, not that defendant should
have known of relevant enforcement provisions), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988).
221. 951 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1992).
222. 932 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1991).
223. Galloway, 951 F.2d at 65 (quoting Thomas, 932 F.2d at 1090).
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Challenges based upon vagueness of the statutory reference to "co-
caine base, '224 as well as Eighth Amendment protections against
cruel and unusual punishment,2 5 have met similar fates.
The deference represented by the federal rational basis test may
be the result of a reasonable fear that an inquiry into the rationality
of one criminal law or penalty may open the door to challenges
against the entire body of criminal law. The decisions regarding
which acts to criminalize and what extent to punish such acts are
necessarily based upon subjective societal impressions of morality
and culpability. Therefore, it is feared that challenges to the phar-
macological basis for enhanced crack penalties call into question not
only the entire classification and punishment of drugs in this coun-
try, but also the entire criminal code. This would potentially require
courts to search for objective proof of culpability for every criminal
violation, as each criminal defendant could argue that their particu-
lar crime was not "culpable enough" to deserve the designated
punishment.
Although judicial deference may be justifiable for the above rea-
sons, its incarnation in the rational basis test leaves the federal
courts blind to the greatest racial injustices carried out as part of the
war on drugs. Moreover, no justification for deference should ab-
solve our constitutional system from its responsibility to provide
224. See, e.g., Thomas, 932 F.2d at 1090; United States v. 'Tuer, 928 F.2d 956,
960 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 625-27 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Van Hawkins, 899 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d
1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 975-76 (D.C. Cir.
1988); United States v. Madison, 781 F. Supp. 281, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
225. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 944
F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1991). But see United States v. Walls, No. 92-0234-LFO, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 979 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 1994). In Walls, the court held that the sentences
under the crack laws as applied to two drug addicts who were "bit players" in a
conspiracy constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at *25. The court noted:
In light of all the circumatances-the historical context of the relevant law, its
legislative history, and these defendants' condition, conduct, and compensa-
tion-the imposition of additional sentences of 8 and 17 years... would be not
only cruel, but also "unusual," because their imposition would be arbitrary and
capricious... and would provide "only marginal contributions to any discerni-
ble social or public purposes."
Idc. (citations omitted). The court elected to sentence the two "bit player" defend-
ants in accordance with the appropriate powder cocaine sentences. Id.
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protection against criminal statutes which have a blatantly discrimi-
natory impact.
B. The Hope of State Equal Protection
The failure of federal constitutional challenges against enhanced
crack penalties places advocates of true equal protection in a "no-
win" position. It is virtually impossible to find elected officials will-
ing to speak out against discriminatory drug laws and policies be-
cause of the political nature of the drug war. 26  The
constitutionalization of civil liberties is based upon the recognition
of this very phenomena: representative bodies are institutionally in-
competent to protect the rights of minority and unpopular groups
against politically popular government actions.22 7 When the federal
constitution is incapable of combating an entire sphere of politically
popular yet discriminatory laws, we are all left helpless. What
makes this problem most disturbing is its scope. The inequalities of
the drug war arguably represent the greatest injustice since slavery:
placing an unprecedented portion of the Black and Latino commu-
nities under the supervision of the criminal justice system and caus-
ing equally devastating damages to the economy, the families, and
the social fabrics of those communities.
Among the options available for reform - including repeal of
discriminatory drug policies and sentencing reform - the fervor
and popularity of the war on drugs leaves perhaps only one viable
option: to advocate a strengthening of the equal protection doctrine
itself. Specifically, in the last decades, there has been a movement
in state courts to define equal protection under state constitutions as
broader than equal protection provided by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 28 The final section of this Article examines the only example
of a successful state challenge to enhanced crack penalties under a
state equal protection doctrine.
226. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 2, at 566 ("[I]n addition to the political
capital to be gained by waging the war [on drugs, crack] afforded politicians across
the ideological spectrum both an explanation for pressing public problems and an
excuse for not doing much about them."); see also supra note 15.
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
228. See generally Elizabeth A. Sherwin, Sex Discrimination and State Constitu-
tions: State Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 115 (1984); Robert F. Williams, The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law: Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985).
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C. State v. Russell
Gerard Jerome Russell, an African-American, was charged with
possession of several grams of crack under Minnesota Statute Sec-
tion 152.023.229 Under the statute, possession of 3 grams of crack
cocaine carries a penalty of up to 20 years in prison and a presump-
tive sentence of an executed 48 months imprisonment. Under the
same section, possession of 3 grams of powder cocaine carries a
maximum penalty of up to 5 years in prison and a presumptive sen-
tence of a stayed 12 months of imprisonment and probation. 3
Russell and four other Blacks charged with violating section
152.023 jointly moved for dismissal of charges on the ground that
the statute had an adverse impact on Blacks, and therefore violated
federal and state equal protection guarantees.3 The trial court
credited evidence that crack cocaine is used predominantly by
Blacks and powder cocaine is used predominantly by Whites.3 2 Be-
cause a far greater percentage of Minnesota Blacks were sentenced
for possession of three or more grams of crack cocaine and received
more severe sentences than their White counterparts who possessed
three or more grams of cocaine powder, the trial court concluded
229. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. In Hennepin County, Minnesota during 1988, there were 41 convictions
for cocaine powder. Of the 41 defendants, 27 were White, 11 were Black, and 3
were Hispanic. In the same year, all 16 defendants convicted in Hennepin County
for possession of small amounts of crack were Black. The court found that the trend
continued for other offense levels, in both county and state compilations. 5 BNA
GRIM. PRAC. MANUAL 51 (Feb. 6, 1993) [hereinafter CPM].
Evidence presented to the trial court in Russell showed that of all persons charged
with possession of cocaine base in 1988, 96.6% were Black; of all persons charged
with possession of powder cocaine, 79.6% were White. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887
n.1.
Evidence provided by the Hennepin County Attorney showed that from August 1,
1989, to August 1, 1990, the county attorney charged 204 defendants with cocaine
offenses. Of these, 166 (81%) were Black and 38 (19%) were White. However,
since these figures included all cocaine-related offenses, including minor possession
with presumptive probation, the percentages of the White and Black defendants ac-
tually jailed were comparable: 23% of all Blacks and 26% of all Whites were jailed.
But, of the 55 convictions for serious crack offenses, 50 defendants were black and 5
were white. "The state attaches percentages to these numbers in an effort to try and
show equality," the trial court observed, "however, the numbers speak for them-
selves." CPM, supra, at 52.
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that the statute had a discriminatory impact"z 3 The court further
found no rational basis to support the distinction between crack and
powder cocaine.3" Accordingly, the court held that the application
of section 152.023 violated state and federal constitutional equal
protection guarantees.235 The trial court granted the defendants'
joint motion to dismiss and certified the question of the statute's
constitutionality for the court of appeals.3 6 Before the certified
question reached the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme
Court granted a joint petition for accelerated review filed by both
the State and the defendants.3 7
233. 477 N.W,2d at 887.
234. Id. The trial court concluded that "[tlo base penalties on the weight and
makeup of this drug ... is a fallacy. Cocaine is cocaine, 80 proof whiskey contains
the same active ingredients as a can of beer .... There is no justifiable reason to
uphold a statute which results in such unequal treatment of similarly situated indi-
viduals." CPM, supra note 232, at 53. The defense presented expert testimony that
10 grams of cocaine could be converted into 10 grams of crack, while the prosecution
argued that because cocaine is rarely pure, 10 grams of cocaine would likely only
yield 7.3 grams of crack. Id. The State further argued that because crack is smoked,
it enters the bloodstream faster than when cocaine is snorted; the defense countered
with testimony that users often liquify powder cocaine and inject it hypodermically
with much the same effect as if it were smoked. Id.
235. 477 N.W.2d at 887. This case originally came before the Honorable Pamela
G. Alexander on Special Assignment. State v. Russell, Hennepin County, Minn.,
Dist. Ct. No. 89067067, decided Dec. 27,1990. Judge Alexander held that the statute
failed even the rational basis test because there is no justification for such disparate
treatment. "In the same way that distinguishing between two classifications of per-
sons without justifications is unconstitutional, the distinction between the two forms
of the same drug without justification is unconstitutional," explained Judge Alexan-
der. CPM, supra note 232, at 51. "The subject case... involves actions against an
entire race of people who are repeatedly charged under a statute which results in
greater penalties than other persons in possession of cocaine. This is not an isolated
violation of the law but it shows a pattern of conduct which continues to adversely
affect an entire group." Id. at 52. "It is clear that a law that is nondiscriminatory on
its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation." Id. "The facts show that
powder cocaine is used most often by whites and crack/cocaine is used most often by
blacks .... It is most likely safe to assume that the legislature is not completely
unaware of this." Id.
236. Coincidentally, on the same day as the trial court's decision, Minnesota's
Department of Public Safety, Office of Drug Policy released a report recommending
that the Minnesota Legislature reconsider the crack statute. The report urged re-
peal because enforcement of the law was, in effect, a "war on minorities." The re-
port noted that Minneapolis police made about 2,300 drug arrests in 1989, and 75%
of the arrestees were minorities. However, minorities make up only 20% of the
city's population. CPM, supra note 232, at 53.
237. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the
federal constitutional question because it held that the statute vio-
lated the Minnesota Constitution's stricter equal protection princi-
ples. The court said that the federal equal protection requirement
- that a statute be enacted "because of" and not merely "in spite
of" an anticipated discriminatory effect - "places a virtually insur-
mountable burden on the challenger, who has the least access to the
information necessary to establish a possible invidious purpose
.... 238 In interpreting the Minnesota Equal Protection Clause,
however, the court stated that it was not bound by the narrow fed-
eral court interpretation of the federal Equal Protection Clause. 39
Although noting that the statute triggers strict scrutiny,240 the court
declined to undergo a strict scrutiny analysis because the statute
failed to satisfy even the rational basis standard of review under the
Minnesota Constitution.24 Since the early 1980s, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has articulated a rational basis test in equal protec-
tion cases that differs from the highly deferential federal stan-
dard. 42 Minnesota's rational basis test requires:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the
classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbi-
trary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby
238. Id. at 888 n.2.
If government is barred from enacting laws with an eye to invidious discrimina-
tion against a particular group, it should not be free to visit the same wrong
whenever it happens to be looking the other way .... If a state may not club
minorities with its fist, surely it may not indifferently inflict the same wound
with the back of its hand.
Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRmBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at
1518-19 (2d ed. 1988)).
239. Id. at 889.
240. The court noted in dicta that under Article 1, Section 2, of the Minnesota
Constitution, the statute's disparate impact combined with its legislative history
"could have been held to create an inference of invidious discrimination which
would trigger the need for a compelling state interest." Id. at 888 n.2.
Article 1 of the Minnesota Constitution states:
No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the
judgment of his peers ....
MN. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1976).
241. 477 N.W.2d at 889.
242. Id. at 888-89. See also Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation
Test: The Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 709
(1984) (analyzing the Minnesota Supreme Court's revitalization of substantive due
process).
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providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation
adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification
must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is
there must be an evident connection between the distinctive
needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3)
the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legiti-
mately attempt to achieve. 243
Under the Minnesota rational basis test, the court has been "unwill-
ing to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification," as is
common under the federal rational basis test. Under the Minnesota
Constitution, rational basis requires "a reasonable connection be-
tween the actual effect of the challenged classification and the statu-
tory goals." 2 "
In Russell, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it generally
avoids inquiries into the legislative process when criminal punish-
ment is involved. However, the court found that the correlation be-
tween race and the use of crack or powder cocaine and the resulting
disparate punishment "cries out for closer scrutiny of the challenged
laws., 145 Moreover, the court stated that it was particularly appro-
priate to apply the stricter state constitutional standards where, as
here, "the challenged classification appears to impose a substantially
disproportionate burden on the very class of persons whose history
inspired the principles of equal protection. 2
46
The first prong of the Minnesota rational basis test requires a sub-
stantial distinction between elements of a statute that are classified
differently - crack and powder cocaine in this case. The State at-
tempted to rationalize the crack/powder cocaine distinction created
by section 152.023, but the court rejected all three proffered justifi-
cations.247 In doing so, the court noted generally that the State must
243. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
244. Id. at 889.
245. Id. at 888 n.2.
246. Id. at 889.
247. The Russell court also noted that the State failed to meet the second and
third prongs of the Minnesota rational basis test. The crack/powder cocaine distinc-
tion was not relevant to the purpose of the law, and therefore failed the second
prong. Id. at 891. The Stated failed the third prong because the law employed an
"illegitimate means to achieve [the statutory] purpose." Id. The statute created an
"irrebuttable presumption of intent to sell without affording the defendant an af-
firmative defense of lack of intent to sell." Id. Because this presumption yields a
harsher punishment, the means chosen to affect its purpose are constitutionally sus-
pect. Id.
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offer more than anecdotal evidence in support of the
classification.'
First, the State argued that the distinction facilitates prosecution
of "street level" drug dealers.249 Rather than being a rational means
to combat street level drug dealing, the court said that the formula
was arbitrary and merely penalized some users as if they were deal-
ers- 50 Second, the State argued "that crack is more addictive and
dangerous than cocaine powder."'" The court held that these dif-
ferences actually resulted from the mode of ingestion, rather than
any substantive distinction between the drugs, and therefore could
not justify the statute.252 These differences could not justify dispa-
rate treatment in light of evidence that powder cocaine, when in-
gested intravenously, produces the same effects purported to justify
the harsher penalties for crack5 3 Finally, the court rejected the
State's third justification - that more violence is associated with the
use of crack - because it was based only upon anecdotal evidence.
The State's assertion that crack is associated with more violence
than powder cocaine also failed to recognize studies concluding that
if such differences exist, they could be caused by factors such as
gang warfare or group behavior, and not by the pharmacological ef-
fects of crack. 5 4
The Russell court recognized that it generally cannot question the
scientific accuracy of legislative determinations under the more def-
248. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
249. Id. The State argued that this purpose was the sole basis of the legislation,
and the 3 to 10 gram formula was adopted because these levels were thought to
indicate a level at which dealing, not merely using, took place. Id. at 891. The State
further argued that pharmacological differences between the substances were irrele-
vant to the constitutional analysis. The other justifications were imputed to the
State by the court. Id.
250. Id. at 890. The court cited a recent report stating "that police and prosecu-
tors contacted by researchers are not persuaded by the 'street dealer' distinction
because they believe that most cocaine powder users are dealers as well." Id. (citing
MINNESOTA DRUG STRATEGY, MINNEsOTA DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFICE OF
DRUG POLICY 14 (1991)).
251. Id. at 890.
252. Id.
253. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 890. "Disparate treatment ... is not justified on the
basis of crack's greater dangerousness when there is evidence that powder cocaine
could readily produce the effects purported to justify a harsher penalty for posses-
sion of crack." Id.
254. Id. at 890.
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erential federal rational basis test." 5 However, under the Minne-
sota Constitution's stricter rational basis test, more factual support
than presented by the State was required to establish the substantial
distinction between the two substances necessary to uphold the
law.256 The court concluded that section 152.023 of the statute vio-
lated the defendants' equal protection rights and affirmed the dis-
missal of charges against them.257
CONCLUSION
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly how
much of the drug war's racially discriminatory incarceration results
from bias in drug scheduling and penalty setting. Other factors not
addressed in this Article which contribute to this disparate impact
include enforcement strategies targeting urban communities, where
a higher portion of the residents are people of color," 8 and reliance
on street level enforcement.25 9 Together, these factors have contrib-
uted to the historic over-incarceration of people of color through
drug prohibition, an over-incarceration which has increased to epic
and unconscionable proportions in the past decade. The proven dis-
parate impact of the war on drugs should raise suspicions regarding
the discriminatory impact of drug statutes, even if the facial neutral-
255. Id.
256. Id. In concurring, Justice Simonett denied that the majority holding was a
revival of Lochner substantive due process. Id. at 893 (Simonett, J., concurring).
Justice Simonett suggested that the stricter Minnesota rational basis test should only
be applied to a facially neutral criminal statute where that statute has a substantial
discriminatory racial impact. Id. at 894. Absent this showing, Justice Simonett
urged courts to apply the more deferential federal rational basis test. Id. at 894-95.
257. Id. at 891.
258. Partially as a result of residential patterns, statistics reveal that the percent-
age of Blacks arrested for drug-related offenses differs significant by type of commu-
nity. In 1990, 44% of the people arrested in cities were Black, whereas Blacks
comprised only 29.3% of drug arrests made in suburban areas and 18.9% of drug
arrests in rural areas. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 448-56, tbls. 4.11, 4.13, 4.15.
Consequently, by focusing drug enforcement resources and making most arrests in
cities, Blacks are arrested for drugs in disproportionately high numbers. In 1989,
officials made 690,855 arrests for drug violations in cities: 44% of the arrestees were
Black and 55.3% were White. Id. at 448, tbl. 4.11. In suburban areas, 241,979 drug
arrests were made: 29.3% of the arrestees were Black and 70.3% were White. Id. at
452, tbl. 4.13. In rural counties, only 46,772 drug arrests were made: 18.9% of the
arrestees were Black and 78.9% were White. Id. at 456, tbl. 4.15.
259. See Harris, supra note 52, at Al; Top Jailing Rate, supra note 55, at 5.
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ity of these statutes allows them to avoid a "suspect classification"
label under the federal constitution.
The tragedy of this story is that the racial discrimination now de-
fining our nation's attempt at drug control is not recognized by fed-
eral equal protection guarantees, even though, as the Minnesota
court aptly noted, the ethnic group being over-incarcerated is the
"very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal
protection., 260 Given the hysteria of the drug war, it is unlikely that
the problems described in this Article will be solved by our legisla-
tures. Therefore, state courts are likely to be the only bodies that
can apply brakes to the drug war's over-incarceration of non-White
drug users. The expansion of state constitutional equal protection
guarantees beyond those which are provided by the federal constitu-
tion is one effective tool available to them. The Minnesota Supreme
Court in Russell provides an important legal and ethical precedent
for other state courts to follow.
260. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
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APPENDIX
STATE CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING STATUTES
Penalty Ratio
of Cocaine
State Code Section to Crack
Alabama ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2) (1993) 1:1
ALA. CODE § 12-35-5 (1993) (rehabilitation) 10:1
Alaska ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.71.010-11.71.070 (1993) 1:1
Arizona ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3408 (1993) 1:1
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-401 (Michie 1993) 1:1
California CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11351- 2:1
11351.5 (West 1991)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.1
(West 1991)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.073 (West Supp.
1993)
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-405(3a) (West 1:1
1993)
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278(a) (West 56:1
1993)
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4753A(a)(2) (Supp. 1:1
1992) (trafficking); § 4751(a) (possession)
District of D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(1)(A) (1993) 10:1
Columbia
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.135(1)(b) (West Supp. 1:1
1993)
Georgia GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-13-31(a)(1) (1992) 1:1
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712-1240 to 712-1246 1:1
(Supp. 1992)
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(B)(2) (Supp. 1993) 1:1
Illinois ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 570/401a 1:1
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (manufacture or delivery);
para. 570/402(a) (possession)
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-1 (Bums Supp. 1:1
1993)
Iowa IOWA CODE § 124.401(1)(a)(2), (3) (West 100:1
Supp. 1993)
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127a (1992) 1:1
Kentucky Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.1411- 1:1
218A.1412 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992)
(trafficking); §§ 218A.1415-218A.1416
(possession)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:967(A) (West 1992) 1:1
(manufacture & distribution); § 40:967(F)
(possession)
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State Code Section
Maine ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1103(3)(B)
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (trafficking); § 1105
(aggravated trafficking); § 1106 (furnishing);
§ 1107 (possession)
Maryland MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(f) (1992 &
Supp. 1993)
Massachusetts MAss. ANN. LAWS cl. 94C, § 32E(b) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993)
Michigan MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7401-
333.7403 (West 1992)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.021-152.025 (West
1993)
Mississippi MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139 (1993)
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.222(2) & (3) (Vernon
Supp. 1993) (trafficking); § 195.223(2) & (3)
(possession)
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (1993) (sale);
§ 45-9-101 (possession)
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416(7) & (8) (Supp.
1992)
Nevada NEV. REv. STAT. § 453.321 (1991)
(manufacture, sale); § 453.336 (possession)
New N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(I)(a)(1)
Hampshire (Supp. 1991)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-10 (West 1993)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-20 (Michie 1989);
§ 30-31-22 (distribution); § 30-31-23
(possession)
New York N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06(5) (McKinney
1989); §§ 220.03-.21 (possession); §§ 220.31-.44
(sale)
North N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(d)(2) (1993)
Carolina
North
Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23.1.1(c) (1991)
Ohio OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3719.99 (Anderson
1992)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-415(C)(2), (7)
(West Supp. 1993)
Oregon OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992 (Supp. 1992)
Pennsylvania PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(f)(1.1),
§§ 821-825 (1993)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28-4.01 to 21-28-4.01.2
(Supp. 1993)
Penalty Ratio
of Cocaine
to Crack
1:1
90:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
75:1
1:1
7:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
100:1
1:1
6:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
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State
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Code Section
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44.53-370(e)(2) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1992) (trafficking in cocaine);
§ 44.53-375 (possession, distribution, and
manufacture of crack)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-2 (1993)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 1993)
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 481.115-481.118 (West 1992)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4231 (Supp. 1993)
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250 (Michie 1993)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401 (West
Supp. 1993)
W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401 (1992)
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.41 (West 1993)
Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-1031 (1988)
Penalty Ratio
of Cocaine
to Crack
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
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